1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
136.
Iraq also
provided detailed tables of its equipment and activities, which
stated
that it had
produced half a kilogram of uranium 235 enriched to 4 percent
through the
electromagnetic
process and the production of an “unappreciable” quantity of
uranium
enriched
through a centrifuge process, and identifying those that had been
damaged
or destroyed.
137.
Mr Hussein
stated that “careful examination” of the details provided would
enable
the UN
Secretary-General to conclude that the programme did “not entail
any departure
from, or
violation of” the NPT and the IAEA safeguards agreement, which had
been
“constantly
observed”.
138.
Mr Hussein
added that Iraq had been “induced to refrain from declaring some
of
the stages
of the programme though this was not in any way inconsistent with
either the
Treaty or
the agreement” because of a fear of “exaggeration, abuse and
aggression”.
Iraq
therefore believed it was “best to abstain from overt reference to
nuclear technology
so that
such reference might not be taken as a threat to the security of
States or be used
to hinder
the propagation of the peaceful uses of such
technology”.
139.
The decision
to provide details of the nuclear programme was the result of
two
factors.
First, the “comprehensive destruction” of the programme, and
second, “Iraq’s
decision to
destroy anything which might possibly be interpreted as
incompatible”
with
resolution 687. The UN had “chosen to consider the destruction
carried out by
Iraq,
without prior notification and without your participation, as
inconsistent with the
requirements
for the implementation” of resolution 687.
140.
Mr Hussein
stated that he wished to reaffirm Iraq’s “fear of exaggeration
and
deliberate
alarmism in various fields, particularly the nuclear field”. This
had caused
President
George HW Bush:
“… to
declare in November 1990 that Iraq would produce a nuclear weapon
within
two months
and that he was accordingly obliged to expedite launching the
war
and
destroying Iraq’s nuclear capabilities before Iraq could take
advantage of
that opportunity.”
“… this
alone was sufficient reason for a decision to proceed with
destruction.”
142.
The second
reason for Iraq’s actions was the decision to make Iraq pay the
costs
of
implementing resolution 687. Iraq had “hastened its decision on
destruction before
receiving
interminable lists of equipment to be destroyed”.
49