The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
if he
lost the vote in the House of Commons.358
Mr Campbell
wrote that Mr Blair “still felt
we were
doing the right thing. He said even though we were all rightly
irritated by the
Americans,
it was the French we should be really angry with.”
“We were
all outraged at the Blix report. TB said it was political and
dishonest …
Scarlett
said he was wrong in saying the Iraqis were trying to co-operate
more … TB
was very
philosophic about it all. As I sat listening to him on the phone, I
lost count of
how many
times he said: 1. we are right on the issue; 2. we have to see it
through;
3, I’m
philosophical about what it means for me and whether I survive or
not. TB
was keen to
push the idea that the only reason the concessions were coming
was
because of
the pressure we were applying. But there were very real divisions
and
dangers and
the UN was on dangerous terrain. There was a very clear
picture,
clearer
than ever, of the US in one place, us in another, the French in
another, the
Russians in
another, and the UN as an organisation really worried about where
it
was
heading.”
1190.
Mr Campbell
wrote that on 8 March: “Blix didn’t come out as badly as it
might
have done.
In a sense he was almost irrelevant now.”359
He had
agreed with Mr Blair
“the lines
to push for the Sundays [Sunday newspapers] – namely there are two
routes
by which he
can avoid conflict: 1. he disarms, or 2. he goes.” The key was
winning the
necessary
votes at the UN. Mr Blair “was clear we just had to keep our
nerve and keep
striving to
get their votes”.
1191.
Mr Cook
wrote that Dr Blix’s report was “carefully balanced” and
“painfully
honest”,
which was not what the US and UK needed: “No.10 desperately wanted
Blix
to lay
into Saddam and to report no progress, in order that they could
mobilise the
Security
Council for war.”360
1192.
In his
evidence to the Inquiry, Mr Blair drew attention to the
passage in Dr Blix’s
report
which stated:
“It is
obvious that while the numerous initiatives which are now taken by
the Iraqi
side with a
view to resolving some longstanding, open disarmament issues
can
be seen as
active or even proactive. These initiatives three or four months
into the
new
resolution, cannot be said to constitute immediate co-operation.
Nor do they
necessarily
cover all areas of relevance. They are nonetheless
welcome.”361
358
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
359
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
360
Cook
R. The Point
of Departure. Simon
& Schuster UK Ltd, 2003.
361
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, page 114.
396