Executive
Summary
591.
It showed
that, in order to achieve the UK’s desired end state, any
post‑conflict
administration
would need to:
•
restore
infrastructure that had deteriorated significantly in the decade
since
1991, to
the point where it was not capable of meeting the needs of the
Iraqi
people;
•
administer
a state where the upper echelons of a regime that had been in
power
since 1968
had been abruptly removed and in which the capabilities of the
wider
civil
administration, many of whose employees were members of the ruling
party,
were
difficult to assess; and
•
provide
security in a country faced with a number of potential threats,
including:
{{internecine
violence;
{{terrorism;
and
{{Iranian
interference.
592.
In December
2002, the MOD described the post‑conflict phase of operations
as
“strategically
decisive”.201
But when
the invasion began, the UK Government was not
in a
position to conclude that satisfactory plans had been drawn up and
preparations
made to
meet known post‑conflict challenges and risks in Iraq and to
mitigate the risk
of strategic
failure.
593.
Throughout the
planning process, the UK assumed that the US would be
responsible
for preparing the post‑conflict plan, that post‑conflict activity
would be
authorised
by the UN Security Council, that agreement would be reached on
a
significant
post‑conflict role for the UN and that international partners would
step forward
to share
the post‑conflict burden.
594.
On that basis,
the UK planned to reduce its military contribution in Iraq to
medium
scale
within four months of the start of the invasion202
and
expected not to have to make
a
substantial commitment to post‑conflict
administration.203
595.
Achieving that
outcome depended on the UK’s ability to persuade the US of
the
merits of a
significant post‑conflict role for the UN.
596.
The UK could
not be certain at any stage in the year before the invasion
that
it would
succeed in that aim.
597.
In January
2003, the UK sought to persuade the US of the benefits of
UN
leadership
of Iraq’s interim post‑conflict civil
administration.204
Officials
warned that,
201
Paper
[SPG], 13 December 2002, ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on
Iraq’.
202
Minute CDS
to CJO, 18 March 2003, ‘Op TELIC: Authorisation for Military
Operations in Iraq’ attaching
Paper CDS,
‘Chief of Defence Staff Execute Directive to the Joint Commander
for Operation TELIC
(Phases 3
and 4)’.
203
Minute
Straw and Hoon to Prime Minister, 19 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Military
Contribution
to post‑conflict Iraq’.
204
Minute
Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 7 February 2003, ‘Iraq
Strategy’.
79