9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
“… over 100
separate CF [Coalition Forces’] engagements, resulting in
estimates
of maybe as
many as 60 anti-CF killed or wounded, and nine CF injuries, none
life
threatening.”
981.
Maj Gen
Stewart also observed that “more sophisticated and effective IEDs”
were
being used
and that mortars and rockets had been deployed against Basra
Airport and
Shaiba
Logistics Base for the first time.
982.
On 10 May,
Mr Sawers, who had recently returned from a visit to Iraq,
wrote to
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald about Fallujah.560
983.
Mr Sawers
judged that “however messy the compromise that emerged, it
was
better than
a US onslaught that would have flattened parts of the
city”.
984.
He had learned
that:
“… at least
half of the … Fallujah Brigade were recruited from the ranks of
the
insurgents
who had been fighting the American forces in the previous three
weeks.
Their
motivations may vary – some were almost certainly regime elements,
others
might have
been local youths joining what they thought of as patriotic
resistance to
defend
their town. But either way, the idea that the Falljuah Brigade
would now turn
on the
insurgents in the city was fanciful.”
985.
Mr Sawers
emphasised the advice of “political figures” he had met in Iraq
that the
Fallujah
Brigade must be dissolved or dispersed amongst other
units.
986.
In his report
to Mr Straw of the same visit, Mr Sawers
wrote:
“The last
month has taken a heavy toll, and our Iraqi allies were all
depressed.
The
onslaught on Fallujah, the messy compromise to restore calm there …
the
clumsy
handling of Muqtada al-Sadr, the pictures from Abu Ghraib prison,
and US
talk of
‘partial sovereignty’ have had a cumulative effect, denting
Coalition morale,
damaging
the confidence of the Iraqis who want us to succeed, and
encouraging
those who
want us to fail.”561
987.
Mr Blair
and President Bush spoke by video conference on 11
May.562
988.
Mr Blair
agreed that allegations of abuse must not lead to a loss of focus
on the
situation
in Iraq, but thought that the question on the public’s mind was
whether the
Coalition
could succeed, and whether it had a clear plan. Consideration would
be given
to asking
the International Committee of the Red Cross to provide some
independent
verification
of standards in prisons under Coalition control.
560
Letter
Sawers to Sheinwald, 10 May 2004, ‘Fallujah’.
561
Minute
Sawers to Foreign Secretary, 8 May 2004, ‘Iraq’.
562
Letter
Sheinwald to Adams, 11 May 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s video
conference with President Bush,
11
May’.
369