1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
the Joint
Memorandum,315
and a
revised draft UNSCR, including language on sanctions
suspension,
was agreed.316
806.
Throughout
1999, debate and negotiation continued in the UN Security
Council
about the
degree of Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions and the creation of
a
new
inspection organisation to replace UNSCOM against a background of
growing
unpopularity
for sanctions and the desire of a number of States, including P5
members,
to remove
sanctions and resume normal relations with Iraq.
807.
The deadlock
on a resolution addressing all the outstanding issues on Iraq
led
to difficulties
in agreeing the bi-annual rollover of the “Oil-for-Food” programme
and the
adoption,
on 19 November, of resolution 1275 (1999) which extended the
programme
until
4 December. That was followed on 3 December by resolution
1280 (1999), which
extended
the regime for a further seven days to allow extra time for
negotiations among
the
Permanent Members on a “comprehensive resolution”.
808.
Mr Dejammet
stated that the draft resolution, which had been submitted by the
US,
was drafted
in such a way that it would be incapable of implementation, and
that France
had been
told that the vote was being used to bring pressure to bear on the
members
of the
Security Council in relation to discussions on a separate
resolution (the resolution
which
became resolution 1284).
809.
Mr Tan
Sri Hasmy Agam, Malaysian Permanent Representative to the UN,
stated
that the
seven-day extension clearly established a linkage to the
discussions on the
comprehensive
resolution. Malaysia was unhappy about the underlying
assumptions
of that
linkage, including that the difficulties could be resolved within a
week when the
Permanent
Members of the Council had already been discussing a draft for five
months
and had not
reached agreement.
810.
Mr Gennadi
Gatilov, Russian Deputy Permanent Representative to
the
UN,
referred to an earlier Russian draft resolution proposing an
extension of
UN humanitarian
operations in Iraq, reflecting recommendations from the
UN
Secretary‑General
and the recommendations of the humanitarian panel chaired
by
Mr Amorim.
Russia regarded the attempt to set “artificial time limits” on the
need to
reach
agreement on the remaining serious problems in the comprehensive
resolution
as “totally
inappropriate”.
811.
Mr Qin
Huasun stated that the resolution was “mainly intended to force
the
Council to
adopt, as soon as possible, a new omnibus resolution on Iraq”.
China was
“extremely
dissatisfied and disappointed” by the deadlock, but the unilateral
military
strike in
December 1998 was the “main reason” the UN arms-verification
programme
315
Letter
Barton to Barrow, 2 June 1999, ‘Iraq: Future
Strategy’.
316
Letter
Barton to Barrow, 14 June 1999, ‘Iraq: Future
Strategy’.
177