Executive Summary

• A review of UK policy at the end of February 2003 when the inspectors had

found no evidence of WMD and there was only limited support for the second

resolution in the Security Council.

• The question of whether Iraq had committed further material breaches as

specified in operative paragraph 4 of resolution 1441 (2002), as posed in

Mr Brummell’s letter of 14 March to Mr Rycroft.

410.  In addition to providing a mechanism to probe and challenge the implications

of proposals before decisions were taken, a Cabinet Committee or a more structured

process might have identified some of the wider implications and risks associated

with the deployment of military forces to Iraq. It might also have offered the opportunity

to remedy some of the deficiencies in planning which are identified in Section 6 of

the Report. There will, of course, be other policy issues which would benefit from

the same approach.

411.  Cabinet has a different role to that of a Cabinet Committee.

412.  Mr Powell has written that:

“... Cabinet is the right place to ratify decisions, the right place for people to raise

concerns if they have not done so before, the right place for briefings by the Prime

Minister and other Ministers on strategic issues, the right place to ensure political

unity; but it is categorically not the right place for an informed decision on difficult

and detailed policy issues.”190

413.  In 2009, in a statement explaining a Cabinet decision to veto the release of

minutes of one of its meetings under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, Mr Straw

explained the need for frank discussion at Cabinet very cogently:

“Serious and controversial decisions must be taken with free, frank – even blunt

deliberations between colleagues. Dialogue must be fearless. Ministers must have

the confidence to challenge each other in private. They must ensure that decisions

have been properly thought through, sounding out all possibilities before committing

themselves to a course of action. They must not feel inhibited from advancing

options that may be unpopular or controversial. They must not be deflected from

expressing dissent by the fear that they may be held personally to account for views

that are later cast aside.”191

190 Powell J. The New Machiavelli: How to wield power in the modern world. The Bodley Head, 2010.

191 Statement J Straw, 23 February 2009, ‘Exercise of the Executive Override under section 53 of the

Freedom of Information Act 2000 in respect of the decision of the Information Commissioner dated

18 February 2008 (Ref: FS50165372) as upheld by the decision of the Information Tribunal of 27 January

2009 (Ref: EA/2008/0024 and EA/2008/0029): Statement of Reasons’.

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