10.3 |
Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and
stabilisation policy
138.
Separately,
Mr Drummond sent Mr Ian Lee, MOD Director General
Operational
Policy, a
final version of the UK’s “key messages” on post-conflict Iraq, for
Mr Hoon to
draw on in
his meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld.73
The final
two key messages were:
“Oil. Agree
need to resume oil production and export as soon as
possible.
Welcome
your plans to deal with any immediate environmental damage,
and
commitment
to use oil revenues for the benefit of the Iraqi people e.g. … by
adapting
[the]
Oil-For-Food programme. Essential that oil revenues managed
transparently
and
accountably. Perception of US/UK oil grab would rapidly increase
hostility to
the Coalition.
The UN could help us avoid this.
“Level
playing field: Big contracts to rebuild Iraq. Putting UK lives on
line. Expect
level
playing field for UK business in oil and other areas.”
139.
The British
Embassy Washington reported on 13 February that Mr Hoon
had
raised the
issue of financing reconstruction with Secretary Rumsfeld,
including using the
proceeds
from oil sales.74
Secretary
Rumsfeld had agreed that oil revenues were key to
financing
reconstruction and should not be misinterpreted as a reason for the
conflict.
The DoD
would make it clear that Iraqi oil proceeds should go to Iraq’s
people. The OFF
programme
was a good basis on which to work.
140.
Following the
5 February meeting of the US/UK/Australia Working Group on
Day
After
Economic Issues, on 14 February an FCO official sent the US State
Department a
paper
setting out the UK’s thoughts on the steps to be taken in the first
30 and 60 days
after any
conflict.75
The
official advised that the paper reflected FCO, Treasury and
DFID
views, and
was:
“… very
much work in progress, not completely co-ordinated here [in
London], and
at this
stage reflects largely the views of economic and relief specialists
here: it is
not fully
cleared politically.”
141.
The paper set
out strategic and specific operational objectives for six
issues,
including
oil. The key strategic objective for oil was: “Maximum continuity
in oil
production
and exports.” The specific operational objectives for oil in the
first 30 days
included:
“•
secure
National Oil Company infrastructure (offices and staff as well as
technical
infrastructure)
…
…
73
Letter
Drummond to Lee, 11 February 2003, ‘Iraq Post Conflict: Key
Messages’ attaching Paper Cabinet
Office, 11
February 2003, ‘Iraq Post Conflict: Key Messages’.
74
Telegram
203 Washington to FCO London, 13 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Defence
Secretary’s Visit to
Washington’.
75
Letter FCO
[junior official] to US State Department official, 14 February
2003, ‘Iraq Day After: Trilateral
Economic
Discussions – Follow-up’ attaching Paper, 14 February 2003, ‘Iraq
Day After: Preliminary UK
Views on
Economic Actions in First 30/60 Days’.
395