9.6 | 27 June 2007 to April 2008

“Even on Friday evening when I listened to Mohan brief his Basra plan to Petraeus

and Iraqi Ministers and senior officers, it was assumed that he would be the one

to implement it … By Saturday, however, Maliki was suggesting that the situation

in Basra had degenerated to such an extent that he would need to go there with

additional forces; by MCNS on Sunday he was talking of taking two IA battalions …

and a brigade of National Police … with him. In the margins of the meeting it was

being suggested that Major General Aziz (Deputy Commander of 11th IA Div) would

replace Mohan …”422

863. Lt Gen Cooper also reported that Vice President Mehdi lifted his veto of

the Provincial Powers Law following “considerable US pressure, including from

Vice President Cheney”.

864. Government officials working closely with the military reported on 24 March that

the OMS was considering breaking off the truce in Basra in 24 hours’ time as a reaction

to Prime Minister Maliki’s presence in Basra.423

865. On Tuesday 25 March, Prime Minister Maliki began his operation in Basra.424

866. It triggered heavy fighting between the ISF and militias in Basra and outbreaks of

violence elsewhere in Iraq.425

867. On Wednesday 26 March, Prime Minister Maliki offered the militias a 72-hour

period in which to hand over their weapons and sign a pledge to renounce violence.

By the following day, the UK assessed that there had been almost no take-up.

868. Mr Prentice reported to the FCO in London on 27 March that Ambassador Crocker

was surprised by Prime Minister Maliki’s decision and had “expected a Basra operation

to come later on the agenda”.426

869. Lt Gen Cooper told the Inquiry that, in his testimony to Congress, Gen Petraeus

“made it very clear that the coalition was taken by surprise by Prime Minister Maliki’s

decision to go south”.427 Once announced, Lt Gen Cooper reported Gen Petraeus’ view

as: “this is an Iraqi operation. It clearly can’t be allowed to fail.”

422 Minute Cooper to CDS, 25 March 2008, ‘SBMR-I’s weekly report (293) 25 Mar 08’.

423 Email government official working closely with the military, 24 March 2008, ‘[…] Threat to Truce

between MND(SE) and JAM in Basrah’.

424 BBC News, 25 March 2008, Basra’s gun rule risks Iraq future.

425 Briefing [unattributed], 27 March 2008, ‘The Current Security Situation in Basra’.

426 eGram11590/08 Baghdad to FCO London, 27 March 2008, ‘Iraq: Meetings with US Ambassador and

UNSRSG, 27 March’.

427 Public hearing, 15 December 2009, page 75.

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