The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

295.  Lt Gen Rollo also wrote that it was important to be clear with the US about UK

intentions:

“US slides continue to show a brigade in Basra bedecked with the Union Jack

when coalition/US force levels have reduced to only five brigades. If this is not

our policy then we should say so, and agree an event or time at which we step

out of their plan.”

296.  Lt Gen Rollo predicted that in his report to Congress Gen Petraeus would

“acknowledge the need to drawdown, but will wish to maintain the present policy of

securing the population while simultaneously transitioning steadily to the ISF”.

297.  Neither Mr Browne nor Mr Miliband attended Cabinet on 4 September.141 Mr Brown

said that had they been there, they would have provided an update on the position in

Iraq and Afghanistan; he would ask them to report to a future Cabinet.

298.  On the same day Maj Gen Wall briefed the Chiefs of Staff that the security situation

across Iraq “remained positive”, with civilian casualties at their lowest level since the

beginning of 2006; “prospects currently appeared positive” for the effectiveness of the

six-month JAM cease-fire; but there was a recognised risk of a significant AQ-I attack in

the run-up to the Gen Petraeus/Ambassador Crocker statement to Congress.142

299.  The Chiefs of Staff observed that “it was important that a period of stability elapsed

before the handover could be considered a complete success. The pressure to achieve

PIC needed to be maintained …” The remaining potential barriers to PIC were the

removal of Governor Waili (still legally challenging his dismissal) and the continuance of

Gen Mohan and Gen Jalil in post until PIC.

300.  A CIG assessed Iraq’s relations with its neighbours on 4 September.143 It judged:

“Iran wants Multi-National Forces (MNF) to leave Iraq and is actively working to

make life as difficult as possible for them. Iran will tolerate short-term instability to

force a humiliating MNF withdrawal. Iranian support for Shia extremists continues

unabated.

“Syria also wants MNF to leave Iraq … Syria continues to provide safe haven to

some Sunni groups supporting insurgent activity in Iraq, particularly those linked to

the Iraqi Ba’ath party …

“As the prospect of MNF drawdown looms larger, Iraq’s Sunni neighbours are

increasingly fearful of a descent into civil war, an emerging Al Qaida safe-haven,

or an Iranian-dominated Shia state … So long as Iranian influence is seen to be

increasing, regional tensions will continue to rise.”

141  Cabinet Conclusions, 4 September 2007.

142  Minutes, 4 September 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

143  CIG Assessment, 4 September 2007, ‘Iraq: Relations with the Neighbours’.

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