3.7 | Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003

TB was keen to get up the clusters document and also move towards the sense

of an ultimatum. He and David were both now expressing their irritation at the US.

David was even of the view that we should be pushing the US to a version of the

Franco-German idea of inspections with force, a blue beret [UN] force involved

on disarmament.”355

1183. When Mr Blair spoke to President Bush, they discussed progress and further

lobbying.356

1184. Mr Blair emphasised again the importance of securing nine positive votes

for Parliamentary approval for military action.

1185. Mr Blair stated:

“… there remained a confusion in many minds … about time. If Saddam had

decided to co-operate fully, the inspectors could have as much time as they wanted.

But he had not – no-one believed he was co-operating unconditionally and fully. Ten

days was of course not enough for him to disarm fully, but it was enough to make

a judgement on whether there was a change of heart. In 1441 we had all agreed to

full, immediate and unconditional co-operation, not concessions dribbled out under

the threat of force.”

1186. Mr Campbell wrote that Mr Blair had:

“… wanted to give him [President Bush] a clear message about the political realities,

namely that we couldn’t do this without a Commons vote and it was not going to be

easy without a second resolution, or with a resolution that was vetoed. The Russian

veto was a new element … Putin’s position had clearly hardened. During their call

Putin was very clear that he felt taken for granted by the Americans …”357

1187. Mr Campbell also wrote that President Bush:

• was agreeing to a slightly later deadline, 17 March;

• had told Mr Blair that he would “certainly go for a vote on the second resolution”,

although he was “still making clear he didn’t feel he needed a UNSCR”;

• “was at least conscious of the difficulties they gave us”; and

• had said to Mr Blair, “don’t worry, I’ll be more subtle than you fear …”

1188. Mr Blair had a meeting with Mr Powell, Baroness Morgan, Mr Campbell and

Mr Pat McFadden, Mr Blair’s Deputy Chief of Staff, to discuss the “what-ifs”, including

355 Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown

to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.

356 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with Bush, 7 March’.

357 Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown

to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.

395