4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
It is clear from
the email that the timing of publication was uncertain, and that
Mr Sedwill
and
Mr Campbell had discussed the possibility of publication in
the week beginning
17 September.
356.
Mr Sedwill
commented that the draft was “much better than earlier drafts”
and
“could move
further in the direction of factual analysis”. The document needed
to “set
out the
problem, rather than the solution”; people “should conclude that
for themselves”.
He made
a number of detailed suggestions for additions and amendments to
the draft.
His
suggestions included:
•
The
Executive Summary could be “tweaked a bit” to “explain the
centrality
of WMD”
to Saddam Hussein’s rule, for example his projection of
power.
•
“Crucially”,
Section 2 needed to “explain the role of WMD in the
political
mythology
which has sustained the regime, implicitly why giving it up
would
amount to a
change of regime and how responsibility for WMD rests with
those
parts of
the apparatus on which Saddam depends for his own security.
People
need to
understand that for Saddam giving up WMD is not like a British
Govt
deciding we
don’t need Trident any more …”
•
Section 3
should be depersonalised “a bit”, with references to “the regime”
rather
than Saddam
Hussein.
•
The effects
of chemical and biological agents could be explained “more
vividly”.
•
Sections 3
and 4 should be combined to “demonstrate more explicitly the
link
between
UNSC [UN Security Council] action and persistent Iraqi
obstruction”.
•
The history
of weapons inspections was “an interesting story and would give
the
media a
better feel for the difficulties they faced and the persistence of
the Iraqi
obstruction”.
It should be expanded.
•
Section 6,
setting out the detail of Iraq’s programmes, was the “crux” of
the
dossier and
should be as factual as possible.
357.
Mr Sedwill
subsequently reported that Mr Straw had endorsed his comments
and
offered a
number of additional points.169
358.
Mr Straw’s
suggestion that the Foreword should be signed by Mr Blair is
addressed
later in
this Section.
359.
A junior
official in the UK Permanent Mission to the UN in New York
(UKMIS
New York)
replied that it would “probably be a bit much to deposit the whole
report with
the
Security Council, though we could deposit something like Section 6
if this were
169
Email
Sedwill to Gray, 11 September 2002, ‘Iraq Dossier: 10/9
Version – Foreign
Secretary’s
Comments’.
170
Letter FCO
[junior official] to Sedwill, 12 September 2002, ‘Iraq: The
Dossier’.
181