6.4 | Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001 to January 2003

442. Mr Blair discussed options for a UK military contribution in Iraq with Mr Hoon on

5 September.241 Mr Straw was also present.

443. There was no No.10 record of the discussion, but Mr Watkins recorded that no

decisions were taken and Mr Blair “did not expect President Bush to commit himself

imminently to a military campaign”.

444. On 6 September, Mr Watkins sent No.10 an assessment of US military plans and

factors informing a UK military contribution in Iraq. He cautioned that the assessment

was “necessarily provisional”, partly because the US plan was still evolving, and partly

because there had not yet been “detailed joint planning with the US”.242

445. Mr Watkins described three UK military options (Packages 1 to 3) ranging from

minimum to maximum effort. He also drew attention to the “sketchy” post-conflict plans

and the importance of keeping in mind the US timetable when identifying the contribution

the UK might offer and the influence it was hoped to bring.

446. Copies of the letter were sent to Mr Straw’s and Sir Andrew Turnbull’s Private

Secretaries, and to Mr Bowen in the Cabinet Office.

447. The letter is addressed in more detail in Section 6.1.

448. On 6 September, Mr Webb told Mr Lee that Mr Feith had asked for UK advice on

post-Saddam Hussein regimes.243 Mr Webb suggested that officials work on an FCO-led

piece “to contribute to a key gap in US thinking”.

449. The FCO produced papers on post-Saddam Hussein regimes during September

and October and the subject was discussed at the first round of US/UK/Australia talks on

post-conflict issues in Washington on 6 November. The papers and the Washington talks

are described later in this Section.

450. Although it is likely that UK papers were shared with the US in the context of those

talks, the Inquiry has seen no documentary evidence of a UK paper on post-Saddam

Hussein administrations being shared with the US until 12 December.

451. At Camp David, Mr Blair told President Bush that an enormous amount of

work would be needed to get post-Saddam Hussein Iraq right.

452. The meeting between President Bush and Mr Blair at Camp David on 7 September

was in two parts, addressed in more detail in Section 3.4.

453. Mr Blair, supported only by Sir David Manning, discussed Iraq with President Bush,

Vice President Cheney and Dr Rice from 1600 to 1745.244 Sir David recorded that, during

241 Minute Watkins to DG Op Pol, 5 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.

242 Letter Watkins to Manning, 6 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Military Planning’.

243 Minute Webb to DG Op Pol, 6 September 2002, ‘Close Allies: Berlin 4 September: Iraq Margins’.

244 Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 8 September 2002, ‘Your Visit to Camp David on 7 September:

Conversation with President Bush’.

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