The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

947. Mr O’Brien and Mr Chilcott discussed post-conflict issues in Washington on

13 March.404 The British Embassy reported that US interlocutors accepted the need

for a “UN badge” for Phase IV and that there was “general agreement that the [UK]

draft [resolution] was 80 percent congruent with the [US] Administration’s position”,

but the US wanted to retain as light a UN touch as possible, with Coalition control over

a Transitional Civilian Administration (TCA) and the IIA. Finding the right UN Special

Co‑ordinator would be key.

948. The Embassy reported that Mr O’Brien’s US interlocutors had confirmed that the

administration of Iraq would be “uniform”. ORHA would not treat areas controlled by UK

forces differently and there was “no question of food distribution or public sector salaries

stopping at the borders of any British sector”. Although the Ba’ath Party would be

disestablished, “the vast majority of members would need to be left in place”.

949. Mr Chilcott stayed in Washington for a second day of talks on 14 March.405

The Embassy reported that US participants had stated that control over the TCA, and in

particular the IIA, could not be given to a UN Special Co-ordinator and that most of the

tasks the UK assigned to a UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) would be carried

out by the Coalition-led TCA.

950. The AHGI discussed the UK/US consultations on the role of the UN on 14 March,

before officials in London had seen the report of Mr Chilcott’s second day of talks in

Washington.406

951. On 17 March, Mr Dodd reported the AHGI discussion to Sir David Manning:

“There is ‘80 percent agreement’ with the US on the role of the UN. For example,

the US agrees that food distribution and civil service salaries should be organised

nationally. The remaining significant point of difference is whether the transitional

administration should be subordinate to a UN representative. The FCO believe it

unlikely that the UN Security Council will mandate the administration unless it is.”

952. Mr Dodd also reported that the IPU was considering how best to approach other

donors for support on Phase IV.

953. Concerns remained about UK companies’ access to reconstruction contracts

in Iraq.

954. Mr O’Brien used his visit to Washington on 13 March to lobby on behalf

of UK firms.

404 Telegram 341 Washington to FCO London, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq day after: Mr O’Brien’s visit’.

405 Telegram 346 Washington to FCO London, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq day after: US proposals for post-

conflict administration’.

406 Minute Dodd to Manning, 17 March 2013, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’.

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