The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
disputed
the suggestion that Iraq could not see light at the end of the
tunnel. The
existing
resolutions already clearly illuminated “the exit” and the present
resolution
added
“significantly to that by offering Iraq a possible suspension of
sanctions well
before full
compliance”. But co-operation was not “a question of attitude” but
about
“performance”;
and he thought it was “not realistic to expect an early positive
signal
from Baghdad”.
837.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock stated that holding Iraq to its obligations and
containing
the threat
to the peace and security of the region was “one of the most
important
responsibilities
of the international community, and in particular of the Security
Council”.
Throughout
1999, the Council had worked to find a “new approach” to business
with
Iraq which
was “firmly set in the framework of a collective responsibility
exercised within
the United
Nations”. The resolution preserved “the original disarmament
standards for
Iraq” and
met humanitarian concerns while belatedly recognising “just how
dire Iraq’s
response
has been to its obligations with regard to missing Kuwaiti citizens
and property”.
“Most
significantly”, it set out “a series of clear, logical steps, using
the new concept of
suspension
to bring Iraq out of sanctions and back into the international
community”. But
that would
happen “only if Iraq at last begins to act according to the rules
of international
law”; and
its track record and recent rhetoric were “hardly
encouraging”.
838.
Sir Jeremy
concluded by calling for full support in the Council in bringing
the
provisions
of the mandatory resolution into effect, for the benefit of “the
peoples of Iraq
and of the
region” and in the “interests of the future authority” of the
UN.
839.
The UK’s
short-term objective had been “an agreed Security Council approach
on
the way
forward … allowing us to draw a line under the differences which
developed
over
Operation Desert Fox”.319
840.
A note for
No.10 on the background to the inspections process, produced in
March
2002 by FCO
Research Analysts, stated that the “main feature” of resolution
1284 was
that it
offered Iraq “a suspension of sanctions in return for co-operation
with the weapons
inspectors,
including progress on key disarmament tasks”, in contrast to
resolution 687
(1991)
which offered lifting of sanctions “only when the inspectors say
disarmament
is
complete”.320
Iraq
regarded the latter as “an unattainable goal”, claiming that
the
resolution
was “so ambiguous” that the US could “easily deny” that
co-operation had
been
“adequate”.
841.
The paper also
stated:
“We
recognise there are ambiguities … They are there for a good reason:
the P5
was unable
to reach agreement. If positions remain as entrenched as they
were
during …
negotiations, there is little prospect of the situation changing
…”
319
Letter
Goulty to McKane, 20 October 2000, [untitled].
320
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 15 March 2002, ‘Iraq’ attaching Paper
FCO, [undated], ‘Iraq: Weapons
Inspectors’.
184