5 | Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to March 2003

because of ‘false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by

Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure to comply with, and co-operate fully

in the interpretation of, this resolution’.”

936. It is unclear what specific grounds Mr Blair relied upon in reaching his view.

937. In his advice of 7 March, Lord Goldsmith had said that the views of UNMOVIC

and the IAEA would be highly significant in demonstrating hard evidence of

non‑compliance and non-co-operation. In the exchange of letters on 14 and 15

March between Mr Brummell and No.10, there is no reference to their views; the

only view referred to was that of Mr Blair.

938. Following receipt of Mr Brummell’s letter of 14 March, Mr Blair neither

requested nor received considered advice addressing the evidence on which

he expressed his “unequivocal view” that Iraq was “in further material breach

of its obligations”.

939. Senior Ministers should have considered the question posed in

Mr Brummell’s letter of 14 March, either in the Defence and Overseas Policy

Committee or a “War Cabinet”, on the basis of formal advice. Such a Committee

should then have reported its conclusions to Cabinet before its members were

asked to endorse the Government’s policy.

940. In Parliament during the second week of March, and in the media, there were

calls on the Government to make a statement about its legal position.

941. When Lord Goldsmith spoke to Mr Brummell on 13 March, they agreed

that a statement should be prepared “setting out the Attorney’s view of the legal

position which could be deployed at Cabinet and in Parliament the following

week”.

942. The message was conveyed to No.10 during the morning of 15 March that

Lord Goldsmith “would make clear during the course of the week that there is

a sound legal basis for action should that prove necessary”.

943. The decision that Lord Goldsmith would take the lead in explaining the

Government’s legal position to Parliament, rather than the Prime Minister or

responsible Secretary of State providing that explanation, was unusual.

944. The normal practice was, and is, that the Minister responsible for the policy,

in this case Mr Blair or Mr Straw, would have made such a statement.

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