3.7 | Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003

• Mr Straw’s statements to the Security Council of 20 January, 5 February and

14 February 2003.229

762. Mr Straw told Ms Annabelle Ewing (Scottish National Party):

“… Iraq has been, and remains in material breach of a string of very clear obligations

that have been imposed on it. It has had a final opportunity to deal with those

violations … but continues to pose the clearest possible threat to international

peace and security through its possession of weapons of mass destruction and

long-range missiles, and its defiance of international law. I hope that the whole

of the international community will recognise the responsibilities borne by it and

by individual members of the Security Council to ensure that international law means

what it says. I still hope that we can gain enforcement by peaceful means but, if we

cannot, the serious consequences … we spelled out in … resolution 1441 will have

to follow through.”230

763. Subsequently, in response to Ms Joan Ruddock (Labour), Mr Straw stated:

“I continue to hope that a vote [on the draft resolution] can be avoided because the

purpose of the resolution is to serve very clear notice on Saddam … that the final

opportunity has nearly passed.”231

764. In a statement on 25 February, Mr Blair rehearsed the Government’s strategy.

765. On 25 February, Mr Blair made a statement in the House of Commons on Iraq.232

766. Mr Blair provided a brief history of the crisis in which he emphasised Saddam

Hussein’s concealment of his biological and nuclear weapons programmes from the

inspectors and his continued deception.

767. Mr Blair stated that the intelligence was “clear” that Saddam Hussein continued

“to believe that his weapons of mass destruction programme is essential both for internal

repression and for external aggression”. It was also “essential to his regional power”.

“Prior to the inspectors coming back in”, Saddam Hussein “was engaged in a systematic

exercise in concealment of those weapons”. The inspectors had reported some

co‑operation on process, but had “denied progress on substance”.

768. Mr Blair said that the UK, US and Spain had introduced a resolution deciding

that Iraq had “failed to take the final opportunity”, but would “not put the resolution

to a vote immediately” to “give Saddam one further final chance to disarm voluntarily”.

The UN inspectors would have a further report to make in March but the time had come

for Saddam Hussein to decide. Peaceful disarmament required active co-operation.