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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
Mr Brown and Sir Andrew Turnbull.188 DFID preparations were well in hand; those of the
UN humanitarian agencies and US and UK military were not. Ms Short stated that “UK
Armed Forces are not configured or supplied to provide substantial humanitarian relief”.
321.  Ms Short identified the three “critical steps” which would help joint DFID/MOD
planning for humanitarian action. Those included “clarity over the scale of resources
my department will have to support the provision of humanitarian and reconstruction
assistance in Iraq”; DFID had earmarked £65m for humanitarian relief and
reconstruction.
322.  Treasury officials advised Mr Boateng on 14 March that DFID should cover
any “early humanitarian” costs, given its responsibility for humanitarian issues and
to incentivise it to become more engaged in planning and delivery of immediate
post‑conflict humanitarian assistance.189 The Treasury’s “option B” was that the MOD
claimed its expenditure on humanitarian relief from the Reserve, as part of NACMO.
323.  Mr Boateng commented on the advice: “Option B is my strong preference in the
current climate.”190
324.  Mr Boateng wrote to Mr Hoon on 17 March, two days before the invasion, agreeing
that the MOD could spend up to £20m to assist displaced persons and up to £10m to
provide humanitarian assistance for one month.191 The arrangement would be reviewed
after that period.
325.  The military’s preparedness to deliver humanitarian assistance in the UK’s AO is
considered in Section 6.5.
DFID SECURES ADDITIONAL FUNDING FROM THE RESERVE
326.  Ms Short told the House of Commons on 13 March that she had provided a further
£6.5m to support humanitarian contingency planning by UN agencies and NGOs,
in addition to the £3.5m for UN humanitarian contingency planning announced on
10 February.192
327.  £3.5m of the £6.5m was provided to UN agencies, bringing the total amount
provided by DFID to UN agencies to £7m.193 A DFID official advised Ms Short that
£7m represented 8.5 percent of the UN’s updated funding requirements for humanitarian
preparedness (as set out in their 14 February appeal for US$123.5m).
188 Letter Short to Blair, 12 March 2003, [untitled].
189 Minute Treasury [junior officials] to Chief Secretary, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq Funding’.
190 Manuscript comment Boateng on Minute Treasury [junior officials] to Chief Secretary, 14 March 2003,
‘Iraq Funding’.
191 Letter Boateng to Hoon, 17 March 2003, ‘Op TELIC Funding – Humanitarian Aid and Additional UORs’.
192 House of Commons, Official Report, 13 March 2003, column 21WS.
193 Minute DFID [junior official] to PS/Secretary of State [DFID], 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Humanitarian
Agencies Preparedness Funding Needs’.
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