The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Mr Brown
and Sir Andrew Turnbull.188
DFID
preparations were well in hand; those of the
UN
humanitarian agencies and US and UK military were not.
Ms Short stated that “UK
Armed
Forces are not configured or supplied to provide substantial
humanitarian relief”.
321.
Ms Short
identified the three “critical steps” which would help joint
DFID/MOD
planning
for humanitarian action. Those included “clarity over the scale of
resources
my
department will have to support the provision of humanitarian and
reconstruction
assistance
in Iraq”; DFID had earmarked £65m for humanitarian relief
and
reconstruction.
322.
Treasury
officials advised Mr Boateng on 14 March that DFID should
cover
any “early
humanitarian” costs, given its responsibility for humanitarian
issues and
to
incentivise it to become more engaged in planning and delivery of
immediate
post‑conflict
humanitarian assistance.189
The
Treasury’s “option B” was that the MOD
claimed its
expenditure on humanitarian relief from the Reserve, as part of
NACMO.
323.
Mr Boateng
commented on the advice: “Option B is my strong preference in
the
324.
Mr Boateng
wrote to Mr Hoon on 17 March, two days before the invasion,
agreeing
that the
MOD could spend up to £20m to assist displaced persons and up to
£10m to
provide
humanitarian assistance for one month.191
The
arrangement would be reviewed
after that
period.
325.
The military’s
preparedness to deliver humanitarian assistance in the UK’s AO
is
considered
in Section 6.5.
326.
Ms Short
told the House of Commons on 13 March that she had provided a
further
£6.5m to
support humanitarian contingency planning by UN agencies and
NGOs,
in addition
to the £3.5m for UN humanitarian contingency planning announced
on
327.
£3.5m of the
£6.5m was provided to UN agencies, bringing the total
amount
provided by
DFID to UN agencies to £7m.193
A DFID
official advised Ms Short that
£7m represented
8.5 percent of the UN’s updated funding requirements for
humanitarian
preparedness
(as set out in their 14 February appeal for
US$123.5m).
188
Letter
Short to Blair, 12 March 2003, [untitled].
189
Minute
Treasury [junior officials] to Chief Secretary, 14 March 2003,
‘Iraq Funding’.
190
Manuscript
comment Boateng on Minute Treasury [junior officials] to Chief
Secretary, 14 March 2003,
‘Iraq
Funding’.
191
Letter
Boateng to Hoon, 17 March 2003, ‘Op TELIC Funding –
Humanitarian Aid and Additional UORs’.
192
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 13 March
2003, column 21WS.
193
Minute DFID
[junior official] to PS/Secretary of State [DFID], 4 March 2003,
‘Iraq: Humanitarian
Agencies
Preparedness Funding Needs’.
496