3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
752.
Having been
notified of this point, Mr Straw told the Inquiry that he
had:
“… had the
record checked. No-one can find any telegram of instructions
to
New York
to say ‘Blame the French’. None exist.”261
753.
Mr Straw
added that he spoke frequently to Sir Jeremy on the telephone
but
Sir Jeremy
did not “need instructions”.262
President
Chirac’s intervention spoke
“for itself”;
he had been “absolutely categorically saying” that, “the position
of France
this evening
is that we will vote no”. President Chirac’s statement had
undermined
the UK’s
efforts.
754.
A statement
issued on 17 March by Mr Ivanov said that:
•
Russia had
“firmly adhered” to an agreement made in a telephone call
between
President
Putin and President Bush on 6 September 2002, to “jointly seek
the
unconditional
return of inspectors to Iraq in accordance with UN Security
Council
resolutions
mandating Iraq’s disarmament”.
•
Russia had
taken “a step towards Washington” by helping to pass
resolution 1441
unanimously, and sought Iraq’s “full co-operation and
the
meeting of
all demands” made by UNMOVIC and the IAEA.
•
Russia’s
position, which was “shared by most members of the Security
Council
and by
other states, allowed the establishment of a reliable mechanism
of
inspections
that would be able to disarm Iraq”; and: “Because of this
pressure
from the
international community, disarmament is under way”.
•
In that
context, “the idea of an imminent war against Iraq does not appear
to
be valid”.
It would involve “serious risks to all nations”. “In speaking out
for a
political
solution”, Russia was “striving not only to overcome this
particular crisis
[Iraq] but
also to push for continued joint efforts to solve other
international
problems
that are no less acute”.
•
The
relationship between Russia and the US was “marked by growing
mutual
trust and
the spirit of co-operation”; including “an open and honest
dialogue
over the
most complex issues”. If Russia believed “that war against Iraq”
would
“lead to
harsh consequences”, it should “talk about it openly” with its
partners
in
Washington. Eliminating the threat of Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction by
working
with the US and other countries “and using political means” would
be
“true
partnership”.
•
“The value
of partners and allies” was “not that they automatically agree
with
one another
but that they search together for solutions to solve problems
in
261
Public
hearing, 8 February 2010, page 95.
262
Public
hearing, 2 February 2011, pages 95-96.
533