The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
664.
The update
also included the “latest version” of a paper on handling Iraq in
2005
sent by
Ms Kara Owen, Private Secretary to Mr Straw, to
Mr Quarrey on 9 December.
Mr Quarrey
wrote that Mr Blair had seen earlier versions of the paper and
that it was
“mostly
fine, but it remains very much work in progress and will need to be
revisited
depending
on progress with elections and Iraqiisation”.
665.
The FCO paper,
described as an agenda for discussion with the US,
considered
that
continued progress on Iraqiisation would allow MNF to change during
2005 from
primary
responsibility for security in all areas to a supportive role,
either in support of
ISF
operationally or as trainers or mentors.606
A transfer
of security lead to the ISF could
occur in
summer 2005.
666.
In a note
dated 12 December to his No.10 staff, Mr Blair commented that
the
situation
in Iraq was “worrying”.607
He gave six
reasons for that assessment (see
Section 9.3),
one of which was that the Petraeus Plan did “not seem to be
yielding the
looked‑for
progress”. His note called for a “proper strategy based on a
hard‑headed
reality
check”; the FCO paper was deemed “inadequate”.
667.
In a
discussion with President Bush on 14 December, Mr Blair said
that training
issues
needed careful consideration but he was not clear whether the
problem was the
strategy,
or simply that it needed time.608
He wondered
“were we missing something that
was holding
back the reconstruction and Iraqiisation programmes?”
668.
A JIC
Assessment produced on 15 December considering the ISF
found:
•
On force
levels; that ISF figures did “not provide a guide to real
capability and
quality”,
an example being that only “some 50 percent” of the 87,000 police
“on
duty” were
classified as trained and equipped.
•
On
effectiveness; that while “some progress” had been made among
elements
of the ISF,
the overall performance of the ISF continued to be
“inadequate”.
There was a
lack of “equipment, training, leadership, command and control,
and,
in many
cases, determination to oppose insurgents, particularly when they
feel
vulnerable
with little or no MNF support close by”.
•
On the
environment; that the ISF had been “under sustained attack” and
was
“being
undermined by increasing penetration and intimidation by
insurgents”.
Over 300
ISF members had been killed since August.609
606
Letter Owen
to Quarrey, 9 December 2004, ‘Iraq: 2005’ attaching Paper ‘Iraq:
2005: Forward Look’.
607
Note Blair,
12 December 2004, ‘Iraq’.
608
Letter
Phillipson to Adams, 14 December 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush,
14
December: Iraq and the MEPP’.
609
JIC
Assessment, 15 December 2004, ‘Iraq: the Iraqi Security
Forces’.
200