The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
75.
Challenging
Iraq’s claim that it had no weapons of mass destruction,
Mr Straw
said it
was:
“… the same
old refrain that we have heard … for the past 12 years. Yet
whenever
the
inspectors have caught the regime out, it has first protested, then
conceded that
narrow
point, but then mendaciously claimed that there are no
more.”
76.
Characterising
the choice to be made as whether to “stand firm” in
pursuing
the objective
of disarmament or settling for a policy which would “in truth”
allow
Saddam Hussein
to:
“… rebuild
his arsenal under cover of just enough co-operation to keep
the
inspectors
tied down for years to come. We should not deceive
ourselves.
The alternative
proposals before the Security Council amount to a return to
the
failed policy
of so-called containment. But the truth is that containment can
never
bring
disarmament, nor is it the policy of the United Nations as
expressed in
resolution
1441 and in all the preceding resolutions going back to
1991.”
77.
Stating that
the reality was that Saddam Hussein only responded to pressure,
and
therefore
that that pressure should be increased, Mr Straw said that
Saddam Hussein
had to be
put to the test. The initiative to produce the revised resolution
tabled in
the
Security Council on 7 March stemmed from the Government’s “desire
to secure
a peaceful
outcome”. Negotiations on the detail were continuing and the UK
was
“examining
whether a list of defined tests for Iraqi compliance would be
useful in helping
the
Security Council to come to a judgement”.
78.
Mr Straw
said that he profoundly hoped that the Iraqi regime would “even at
this
late stage,
seize the chance to disarm peacefully”. He added: “The only other
peaceful
alternative
would be for Saddam Hussein to heed the calls of a number of other
Arab
leaders for
him to go into exile and to hand over to a new leadership prepared
to
conform
with the Council’s demands.” If Saddam Hussein refused to
co-operate, the
Security
Council “had to face up to its clear responsibilities” under the UN
Charter.
79.
Addressing the
potential consequences of military action, Mr Straw stated
that the
international
community would have “a duty to build a secure, prosperous future
for the
Iraqi
people”. In his meeting with Mr Kofi Annan, the UN
Secretary-General, on 6 March,
he had
proposed “that the UN should take the lead role in co-ordinating
international
efforts to
rebuild Iraq, and that they should be underpinned by a clear UN
mandate”.
80.
Mr Straw
acknowledged the fear that action on Iraq might “exacerbate
tensions
elsewhere
in the region”, and emphasised the need for progress in restoring
a
meaningful
peace process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. He
concluded:
“A lasting
settlement in the Middle East will remove one great threat to
security …
In
confronting the danger from Iraq’s weapons, the UN can remove
another great
threat. We
must not let Saddam turn his ‘final opportunity’ to disarm … into
endless
414