The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
555.
Sir David and
Dr Rice discussed possible avenues to increase the
diplomatic
pressure on
Saddam Hussein to leave. Dr Rice’s view was that “there were
still two
possible
outcomes to the crisis: Saddam could step down; or the Security
Council would
conclude
that he was not complying with 1441 and that action must follow”.
They agreed
it would be
important to have a clear plan by the end of that
week.
556.
Sir David
asked Sir Jeremy Greenstock to “sound out” Dr Blix about a
possible visit
to London
“in the next few days” because Mr Blair “would like to see
him, one on one, to
discuss
ideas about an ultimatum”. He concluded that the evidence suggested
Dr Rice’s:
“… thinking
on the way forward is similar to ours. We shall have to think hard
about
whether to
press for 14 rather than 8 March as the date for a vote … but at
least
Condi
[Rice] has now moved away from 28 February. This is something the
Prime
Minister
will want to discuss with Bush when they speak later this
week.”
557.
Mr Blair
spoke to Dr Blix on 20 February.
558.
Separately,
Mr Rycroft produced a list of possible elements for
inclusion
in an ultimatum,
drawing on the provisions of resolution 1441:
•
Full
explanations of all the material unaccounted for in the last UNSCOM
report,
and answers
to all of UNSCOM’s questions.
•
A full list
of those involved in the destruction of old chemical weapons
stocks,
and full
and unfettered access to them in interviews at the location of
the
inspectors’
choice and without Iraqi government representatives.
•
Similarly
full co-operation over the interviews of any other witnesses
called
by the
inspectors, inside or outside Iraq.
•
Full
co-operation over any exclusion zones declared by the
inspectors.
•
Full
co-operation over the destruction of the Al Samoud rockets and all
other
material
identified for destruction by the inspectors.153
559.
Sir Richard
Dearlove counselled against specifying the points on
which
Saddam
Hussein should comply; there was “ample evidence” that he was
not,
and had
no intention of, complying. There was no guarantee that
inspections
would
produce conclusive physical evidence.
560.
Sir Richard
Dearlove stated that, in his view, the best course would be to
stick
with a
short text stating that Saddam Hussein was not complying with, and
was
therefore
in breach of, resolution 1441, backed by the available evidence
that that was
the
case.154
Listing the
points on which we wanted Saddam Hussein to comply
would
undermine
the overarching argument of resolution 1441 that it was Saddam
Hussein,
not the
international community, who must do the work of disarmament. The
UK should
avoid
further moves which perpetuated an inversion of roles. Setting
Saddam Hussein
153
Minute
Rycroft to Manning, 17 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Specific
Demands’.
154
Letter
Dearlove to Manning, 17 February 2003, ‘Iraq: The Way
Forward’.
280