The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

to be a mixture of JAM and IPS personnel. A further rescue operation was carried out

successfully (again without casualties) to free them later that evening. The episode

become known as “the Jameat incident”.

230.  Dr Reid updated Cabinet on the incident on 20 September.112 He emphasised

the need to put the incident in context against the substantial progress made in Iraq,

“which the media had not reported”, specifically the January elections and creation of

the Constitution. Those who opposed the creation of a democratic state in Iraq were

“engaged in frantic and frenetic activity” to stop the Constitution being agreed and the

December elections.

231.  Mr Blair invited the FCO, the MOD and No.10 to produce a note explaining the

continuing policy of keeping the political process on track and building up the ISF, that

the MNF were in Iraq in support of a UN resolution and that the insurgency “was not a

struggle against occupying forces”.

232.  On 21 September, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs provided him with

a minute setting out points to make in a phone call with President Bush that afternoon.113

In relation to the events at the Jameat police station it said:

“The incident confirms what we already knew: that Sadrists are a serious and malign

force in the Basra Police; the civil authorities in Basra are either ineffectual in dealing

with, or to some extent complicit in this, and that the central government’s influence

is limited. We need a very strong response, both on the Police/armed forces and

with the civil authorities, in both Baghdad and Basra.”

233.  In their telephone conversation, Mr Blair told President Bush that the events

in Basra showed that “an unrepresentative minority” in the city was prepared to use

violence; a JAM splinter group was involved.114

234.  Mr Blair judged that the basic strategy in Iraq remained the right one, with key

tactical questions in the coming months being whether enough was being done on Sunni

outreach and how to establish confidence in the development of the ISF.

235.  On 21 September, Mr Powell sent Mr Blair a personal note in response to

Sir Nigel’s advice of 19 September.115 It was not sent to anyone else.

112  Cabinet Conclusions, 20 September 2005.

113  Minute Phillipson to Prime Minister, 21 September 2005, ‘Secure phonecall with President Bush, 1410

21 September’.

114  Letter Quarrey to Hayes, 21 September 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s Phone Call with Bush’.

115  Minute Powell to Prime Minister, 21 September 2005, ‘Iraq: Strategy’.

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