2 |
Decision-making within government
202.
Also attached
to Mr Drummond’s minute was a “list of headings for future
work”
on
unintended consequences, which included: “avoiding fragmentation of
a failed state
in Iraq”.
203.
Sir David
Manning replied to Mr Drummond: “Let us discuss p[lea]se with
Tom
McKane
before he goes. We need to do this work: there is a question about
timing.”119
204.
Mr McKane sent
Sir David Manning a note on possible machinery “for
managing
Iraq” on 2
September, which is addressed earlier in this
Section.120
205.
Mr Jonathan
Powell, Mr Blair’s Chief of Staff, instructed Sir David
Manning
“to progress
official groups and leave Minist[eria]l groups for
now”.121
206.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit set out his views about the new Whitehall arrangements
to
Mr Hoon
on 17 September:
“Mindful of
the difficulties (and frustrations) we have experienced in the past
in
establishing
the right machinery and processes to run crucial
politico/military
campaigns,
I saw David Manning yesterday to discuss the arrangements
which
might be
presented to the Prime Minister, designed to help successful
delivery of
an Iraq
campaign.
“I reminded
David of the importance of a small ‘core’ Ministerial team, meeting
very
regularly
to execute daily business (as distinct from less frequent policy
meetings
and Cabinet
itself). I outlined the linkage needed with the wider COBR and
DOP
machinery
that would pull in government departments and agencies as a whole
…
“David said
that he had little influence over such matters as distinct from
Jonathan
[Powell].
However, he took the point, especially about the importance of
acting
through key
Ministers in small groups. The position at present was that the
Prime
Minister
had decided over the weekend on the following:
a. no
Ministerial meetings at this stage;
b.
a
preference, when they became necessary, for the ‘late Afghan’ model
to
apply –
ie PM; Defence Secretary; Foreign Secretary; CDS; C;
Scarlett;
Attorney
General and Alastair Campbell as appropriate;
c.
meanwhile for Restricted COBR meetings to begin on a twice weekly
basis
under
Manning’s chairmanship;
d.
for a wider
DOP Committee of officials to begin work, under
Bowen’s
chairmanship,
which would be the vehicle for bringing in OGDs –
DFID,
119
Manuscript
comment Sir David Manning on Minute Drummond to Manning, 30 August
2002, ‘Iraq:
Unintended
Consequences’.
120
Minute
McKane to Manning, 2 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.
121
Manuscript
note Powell on Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 12 September 2002,
‘Iraq’.
122
Minute
Tebbit to Secretary of State [MOD], 17 September 2002, ‘Iraq:
Machinery of Government’.
299