10.3 |
Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and
stabilisation policy
in occupied
territory on 14 February.78
Mr Grainger
advised that, under the Hague
Regulations:
“… the
Occupying Power acquires a temporary right of administration, but
not
sovereignty.
He does not acquire the right to dispose of property in that
territory
except
according to the strict rules laid down in those regulations. So
occupation
is by
no means a licence for unregulated economic
exploitation.”
148.
Mr Grainger
also advised that:
•
the
reasonable operation of oil wells was likely to be permitted, at
least up to
the rate at
which they were previously operated, but there would be no
right
to develop
new wells; and
•
the current
OFF programme regime assumed a degree of Iraqi
Government
involvement.
In the event of there being “no Government in active control
of
Iraq”, it
was likely that significant changes to the regime would be
required.
149.
On 19
February, at the request of the Cabinet Office, the Joint
Intelligence
Committee
(JIC) produced the Assessment, ‘Southern Iraq: What’s in
Store’.79
150.
The JIC
concluded that: “The
establishment of popular support for any
post‑Saddam
administration cannot be taken for granted.” Support
could be
undermined
by several factors, including a failure to be seen to run the oil
industry in
the interests
of the Iraqi people.
151.
The JIC also
recalled its earlier judgement that Saddam Hussein might seek
to
pursue a
scorched earth policy, including the destruction of oil
wells.
152.
Mr Chilcott
sent Mr Straw’s Private Office a paper on oil policy on 28
February.80
Mr Chilcott
advised that the paper, entitled ‘Iraq Day After – Oil Policy’, set
out
“preliminary,
official-level thinking”. It had been circulated “fairly widely”
across
departments
and incorporated comments from “various” departments. The IPU
planned
to share
the paper with the US “in due course”, after some careful
editing.
153.
The paper
stated that the UK’s economic objectives should be the rapid relief
of
humanitarian
needs and the restoration of public services, and beyond that “to
win the
peace
economically”. Oil revenues would have a key part to play in
achieving those
objectives.
Provided exports were not interrupted, Iraq could finance a
“substantial part”
of the
humanitarian, reconstruction and longer-term rebuilding
effort.
78
Minute
Grainger to IPU [junior official], 14 February 2003, ‘Occupation
Rights: Iraqi Oil’.
79
JIC
Assessment, 19 February 2003, ‘Southern Iraq: What’s in
Store?’
80
Minute
Chilcott to Private Secretary [FCO], 28 February 2003, ‘Iraq Day
After – Oil Policy’ attaching
Paper IPU,
27 February 2003, ‘Iraq Day After – Oil’.
397