3.8 | Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March 2003

763. Asked whether it was the need for the Armed Forces to move which set the

deadline, Mr Powell replied: “Yes”.268

764. Asked whether the approaches from France following President Chirac’s

remarks had made clear that it was not closed to the idea of continuing the inspections

negotiation and, if this led to a particular result, voting for a resolution further down the

track, Sir Jeremy Greenstock replied:

“Yes, that’s probably true. But we knew by 10 March, because we had been talking

with the Americans all along about how much time we had for the benchmarks, that

we didn’t have time for that sort of escape route from what Chirac said.”269

765. Asked about Mr Annan’s report on 12 March that President Chirac was not closed

to compromise, Sir Jeremy stated: “The Americans were closed to compromise.”

766. Sir John Holmes told the Inquiry that the dialogue with France about a second

resolution had continued after President Chirac’s statement:

“… but … it was becoming increasingly clear that this was a game without meaning

at that point, because the military timetable was so close to fruition …”270

767. If the matter had been left to the Security Council to decide, military action

might have been postponed.

768. In his statement for the Inquiry, Sir Jeremy Greenstock said that, “[I]t would have

been in our interests to give the inspectors more time to find a smoking gun”, and

that the second resolution might have taken on a different shape or character on

a different timing.271

769. Sir Jeremy thought it was “more than a 50 per cent chance that, if we had waited

until October, the inspectors would not have found a satisfactory solution and that

military force might well have been used at that point, the difference being the legitimacy

involved in giving the inspectors the greater time”.

770. Sir David Manning told the Inquiry that he believed “letting the inspections run

longer … would have been a useful thing to do”. He:

“… regretted that this process ended when it did, but … by this stage, the United

States was convinced these provisions were not working and it was also convinced

that a second resolution was impossible because of the political backdrop, not

268 Public hearing, 18 January 2010, page 98.

269 Private hearing, 26 May 2010, page 35.

270 Public hearing, 29 June 2010, page 50.

271 Statement, November 2009, page 15.

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