12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
1209.
General
Richard Dannatt, Chief of the General Staff, visited Iraq
from
23 to
25 March 2009.1132
In his
visit report he said:
“… we must
decide and then act with regard to our training support to the
Iraqis …
I know
that work is ongoing to determine the nature of this support but my
short visit
gave me the
impression that both the Officer Academy and the Staff College
appear
to be
standing still, caught in a mire of NATO indecision, and we may
have become
too focused
on the narrow issue of force protection rather than the wider point
of
why we are
there. We need to generate momentum and ensure that the
manpower
we commit
is of appropriate quality, quantity and has a degree of coherence.
If we
get this
right we will deliver strategic effect – I consider it important
that we do so.”
1210.
The UK
remained in protracted negotiations with the Iraqi Government until
early
June over
the size and role of the future UK military presence and the legal
basis under
which it
would operate (see Section 9.7). On 6 June, a
Government‑to‑Government
agreement
was signed and passed to the Iraqi Parliament for
ratification.1133
1211.
On 15 October,
Mr Christopher Prentice, British Ambassador to Iraq,
reported
to the FCO
in London that the UK/Iraq “training and maritime support
agreement” had
completed
its third and final reading in the Council of
Representatives.1134
It passed
with
99 votes in
favour and 40 votes against or abstaining. Mr Prentice
wrote:
“All the
elements of our broad‑based relationship are now in place.
Symbolically, the
ratification
by the Iraqi Parliament of this agreement confirms the will of a
majority of
Iraqi
political groups to continue a special relationship with the UK,
including in the
security
field.”
1212.
In Lt
Gen Cooper’s end of tour report dated March 2009, he commented
on ISF
progress:
“Boulani
has transformed the Ministry of Interior, although much remains to
be done.
The MOD
deserves credit for its growth of the IA [Iraqi Army], and the
possibility
exists that
a generation of bright Iraqi two star commanders may yet replace
the old
nepotistic
and biased leadership with some degree of
professionalism.”1135
1213.
On 31 March,
the UK handed over division command of MND(SE) to the
US.1136
Mr Hutton
reported to Mr Brown that “excellent progress by UK and Iraq
forces
1132
Minute CGS
to PS/SofS [MOD], 25 March 2009, ‘CGS Visit to Iraq – 23‑25 Mar
09’.
1133
Letter
Ferguson to Fletcher, 23 July 2009, ‘Iraq: UK Military Presence
After 31 July 2009’.
1134
eGram
35899/09 Baghdad to FCO, 15 October 2009, ‘UK/Iraq: Training and
Maritime Support
Agreement
Ratified by the CoR, 13 October’.
1135
Report
Cooper, ‘End of Tour Report 4 Mar 08 to 3 Mar 09’.
1136
Minute
Johnstone to PS/SofS [MOD], 1 April 2009, ‘CDS Visit to Iraq
(Basra) to Attend the MND(SE)
Transfer of
Authority Ceremony – 31 Mar 09’.
337