3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
387.
President Bush
warned the Iraqi regime that it had “an opportunity to avoid
conflict”
only if it
took steps to comply with all its obligations [as set out in
Security Council
resolutions]”.
The US hoped the regime would make that choice but it had “little
reason
to expect
it”.
388.
President Bush
also warned the Iraqi regime against attempting “cruel
and
desperate
measures” if it were facing its demise. If Saddam Hussein ordered
such
measures,
his generals would be “well advised to refuse”; “they must
understand that
all war
criminals will be pursued and punished”.
389.
President Bush
stated that waiting to act was “the riskiest of all options”.
There
could be
“no peace” if the security of the US depended “on the will and
whims of a
ruthless
and aggressive dictator”.
390.
Addressing
concerns that regime change could produce instability in
Iraq,
President
Bush concluded that the situation in Iraq:
“… could
hardly get worse, for world security and for the people of Iraq
…
“Freed from
the weight of oppression, Iraq’s people will be able to share in
the
progress
and prosperity of our time … the United States and our allies will
help
the Iraqi
people rebuild their economy, and create the institutions of
liberty in a
unified
Iraq …”
391.
The JIC
Assessment of 10 October stated that Iraq’s ability to
conduct
effective
terrorist attacks was very limited; and it was “inadequate” to
carry
out terrorist,
chemical or biological attacks outside Iraq.
392.
The JIC
also assessed that Saddam Hussein would use terrorism
only
in response
to a US attack.
393.
At the request
of the FCO, the JIC produced a specific Assessment on
10 October
2002 of the
terrorist threat in the event of US‑led military action or imminent
action
against
Iraq.136
That
included an assessment of the relationship between Iraq
and
members of
Al Qaida, and how Al Qaida would “use an attack on Iraq as
further
‘justification’
for terrorist attacks against Western or Israeli
interests”.
394.
The Assessment
stated that Saddam Hussein’s “overriding objective” was to
“avoid
a US attack
that would threaten his regime”, but the JIC judged that in the
event of
US‑led
military action against Iraq, Saddam would:
“… aim to
use terrorism or the threat of it. Fearing the US response, he is
likely to
weigh the
costs and benefits carefully in deciding the timing and
circumstances in
136
JIC
Assessment, 10 October 2002, ‘International Terrorism: The Threat
from Iraq’.
267