The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Mr Martin
Howard, MOD Director General Operational Policy from 2004 to 2007,
told
the
Inquiry:
“… the
Coalition rightly wanted to sort of involve Iraqis from the outset
and, as it
were, start
to build up the seeds of an Iraqi administration. Inevitably the
people
that tended
to be part of that were violently anti-Ba’athist. They were very
keen that
Ba’athism
should be completely removed, and I think that actually did
influence some
decisions
that were made in the middle of 2004 about the Iraqi bureaucracy,
about
the army,
which I think with hindsight were probably the wrong decisions. But
there
was very
strong political pressure from the people who ultimately were going
to be
part of the
government.”244
362.
On 16 May
Ambassador Bremer also issued CPA Regulation No.1.245
It
opened:
“Pursuant
to my
authority as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional
Authority
(CPA),
relevant UN Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1483
(2003),
and the
laws and usages of war”.
Regulation
No.1 continued:
“1. The CPA
shall exercise powers of government temporarily in order to provide
for
the
effective administration of Iraq during the period of transitional
administration,
to restore
conditions of security and stability, to create conditions in which
the Iraqi
people can
freely determine their own political future, including by advancing
efforts
to restore
and establish national and local institutions for representative
governance
and
facilitating economic recovery and sustainable reconstruction and
development.
“2. The CPA
is vested with all executive, legislative and judicial authority
necessary
to achieve
its objectives, to be exercised under relevant UN Security
Council
resolutions,
including resolution 1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of
war.
This authority
shall be exercised by the CPA Administrator.”
All
functions in the CPA reported to Ambassador Bremer.246
The “line
offices” run by seven Directors covered oil, civil affairs,
economic policy, aid,
regional
operations, security affairs and communications. Under these “line
offices”, senior
advisers
were assigned to every Iraqi ministry and charged with running
those ministries
until
August 2003. Once Iraqi Ministers were appointed in August, it was
intended that the
advisers
would act as counsellors, but Ambassador Bremer would retain veto
authority over
Ministerial
decisions, and senior advisers would retain considerable authority
over spending.
By July
2003 the CPA had established branch offices in each of Iraq’s 18
provinces. It took
six months
to staff those offices.
244
Private
hearing, 18 June 2010, page 45.
245
Coalition
Provisional Authority Regulation No.1, 16 May 2003.
246
Dobbins J,
Jones SG, Runkle B & Mohandas S. Occupying
Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional
Authority.
RAND
Corporation, 2009.
196