6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
in the
North then we must participate in the forthcoming CENTCOM/EUCOM
recces
in Turkey”.
569.
On 31 August,
Maj Gen Wilson reported to Adm Boyce that “CENTCOM
clearly
hope the UK
will run with” the northern option.231
He
advised:
“Whilst I
am continually reinforcing the UK policy line to US colleagues in
CENTCOM
(discreet
planning and scoping, but without political endorsement or
commitment),
the demands
of US operational planning necessitate input on UK planning data
and
separately,
our intent for key evolutions [activities] such as ground recces to
Turkey
and
[Exercise] Internal Look. In terms of expectation management, and
without
over
stating it as seen from here, the time for putting more UK military
cards on the
CENTCOM/EUCOM
tables (caveated as necessary) is fast approaching.”
570.
Maj Gen Wilson
also reported that he had been asked about Op FRESCO, and
its
potential
impact on the UK’s ability to contribute to Iraq, which he had
“played long”.
571.
Despite
military advice that the UK might be able to deploy HQ ARRC
and
“division‑scale
forces”, Mr Hoon advised continued caution about the UK’s
ability
to deploy
land forces.
572.
No decision
on a possible UK military contribution to US operations
was
taken
before the meeting with President Bush, but the MOD advised that
there
could be a
need for tough decisions within two weeks.
573.
Mr Blair
decided that the UK should not inform the US about the
potential
impact of
Op FRESCO at that stage.
574.
The
discussions between the UK and US on the policy on Iraq,
Mr Blair’s press
conference
in Sedgefield on 3 September, and the decision that he and
President Bush
would meet
at Camp David on 7 September following a meeting of the National
Security
Council
which would have been briefed by Gen Franks, are addressed in
Section 3.4.
575.
In response to
the MOD advice of 28 August, Mr Blair’s view, as reported
on
3 September
by Sir David Manning, was for “nothing to be said to the US
about
Op FRESCO
for the moment”.232
Mr Blair
hoped it would be possible to discuss the
issues with
Mr Hoon the following week before he flew to
Washington.
576.
Reporting an
MOD meeting on 3 September to Mr Straw, Mr Stephen
Wright, FCO
Deputy
Under Secretary Defence and Intelligence, stated that, in the MOD’s
view, the
Pentagon’s
plans had not firmed up significantly during
August.233
It was
still working on
231
Minute
Wilson to PSO/CDS, 31 August 2002, ‘SBMA SITREP 29’.
232
Letter
Manning to Williams, 3 September 2002, ‘Iraq – Potential UK
Contribution and a Fire Strike’.
233
Minute
Wright to Private Secretary [FCO], 4 September 2002, ‘Iraq:
Military Planning’.
261