The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
the
potential impact of Iraqi attacks using chemical or biological
weapons.180
399.
Without an
overt military build‑up, a “Running Start” military action could
begin as
early as
November, with air strikes and support for opposition groups and
small‑scale
land
operations, while further ground forces built up to overwhelm Iraqi
forces “leading to
the
collapse of the Iraqi regime”. A “Generated Start” following a
military build‑up could
begin as
early as January 2003. That was also judged to be the latest date
for the start
of military
operations unless action was “deferred until the following
autumn”.
400.
The “UK’s
ability to contribute forces depended on the details of US
military
planning
and the time available to prepare and deploy them”. The MOD was
“examining
how the UK
might contribute to US‑led action”. Options ranging from deployment
of a
division to
making bases available had been identified. US plans assumed the
use of
British
bases in Cyprus and Diego Garcia. Unless “publicly visible”
decisions were taken
“very
soon”, the UK would not be able to send a division in time for an
operation in Iraq
in January
2003.
401.
A “decision in
principle” might be “needed soon on whether and in what form
the
UK takes
part in military action”.
402.
Ministers were
invited to “note the potentially long lead times involved in
equipping
UK Armed
Forces to undertake operations in the Iraqi theatre”; and to “agree
that MOD
should
bring forward proposals for the procurement of Urgent Operational
Requirements
under cover
of the lessons learned from Afghanistan” and the “outcome” of the
2002
Spending
Review.
403.
Mr McKane
advised Sir David Manning separately that the paper covered
US
military
plans “only in headline form” on the grounds that Mr Blair
would “wish to receive
a short
oral brief from CDS”.181
404.
The planning
and preparations for equipping UK forces are addressed
in
Section 6.3.
405.
The Cabinet
Office paper was written in order to support a
Ministerial
discussion
about the approach the UK should take to the US on Iraq. It
identified
the issues
the UK should be trying to get the US to address before it embarked
on
military
action to secure regime change in Iraq in a way the UK would find
difficult
to
support.
180
Paper
Cabinet Office, 19 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Conditions for Military
Action’.
181
Minute
McKane to Manning, 19 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
236