4.4 | The
search for WMD
•
CW was the
“thinnest area”, with a “preliminary conclusion” that there
were
“no current
programmes of production and no ability to fill munitions at the
time
of military
action”, but there was “more work to be done”.
•
“As
expected”, the nuclear section included “evidence of plans to
reconstitute
the
programme, including research into isotope
separation”.
•
The section
on delivery systems included “lots on missile
programmes,
intentions,
deception etc”.
•
The section
on destruction and sanitation was a “new element” with “evidence
of
targeted
looting since the end of military action”.270
491.
On the process
of publication, Mr Rycroft explained:
•
The UK was
“pushing” the US to see whether Dr Kay’s Congressional and
public
appearances
could be brought forward from 9 to 8 October, to expand Dr
Kay’s
public
remarks, and to get him to publish at least his
summary.
•
Australia
was “helpfully, pushing for a big public
presentation”.
•
Efforts to
press the US on those and other points were “hampered by the
arms
length
approach the Administration are taking”.
492.
Mr Rycroft
added that some aspects of handling the Interim Report had
been
overtaken
by the “Andrew Neil leak”, which Mr Blair had already
discussed with Mr David
Hill,
Mr Campbell’s successor as Mr Blair’s Director of
Communications and Strategy.
The
Government was saying that it was Dr Kay’s Report, the Government
did not have
it, and any
comment was speculation on “an incomplete Interim
Report”.
493.
On
24 September, the BBC
reported that
a Bush Administration source had told
Mr Andrew
Neil, presenter of BBC
Television’s
Daily
Politics, that the
ISG had found no
494.
In a letter to
Sir Nigel Sheinwald on 24 September, Sir David Manning said
that
he had
repeated to Mr Armitage how important it was to the UK that Dr
Kay stress the
provisional
nature of his first report.272
Sir David
had also explained that there was “an
immediate
timing issue”, with “a difficult Labour Party conference lying in
wait”.
495.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald spoke to Dr Rice on 25 September.273
He explained
the
damaging
impact of the recent leak and the extent of the Prime Minister’s
concern.
The leak
had changed the situation and the UK hoped it would be possible to
bring
forward Dr
Kay’s testimony in order to reduce the period of
uncertainty.
270
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 24 September 2003, ‘ISG
Report’.
271
BBC
News,
24 September 2003, ‘No WMD in
Iraq’, source claims.
272
Letter
Manning to Sheinwald, 24 September 2003, ‘Conversation with
Rich Armitage’.
273
Letter
Sheinwald to Adams, 25 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation
with US National Security
Adviser’.
523