The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1160.
Mr Straw
and Mr Hoon gave little detail of what UK forces would be
required to do
immediately
after the invasion:
“Much will
depend on how the campaign develops, but in the first few weeks
we
should
expect Coalition forces to be spread across Iraq. The expectation
is that UK
forces will
end up in southern Iraq, loosely centred on Basra. However, we
should
be prepared
for elements of our forces to be dispersed fairly widely across
Iraq …
“US
military planning continues to be fluid. But it envisages Coalition
forces
re‑deploying
into a more tailored security framework as soon as the
situation
permits.
The military task will be to facilitate a secure environment
(including law
and order,
deterring adventurism and a variety of military-technical tasks) to
enable
immediate
humanitarian relief to be conducted. To help UK forces win hearts
and
minds, HMT
have allocated them £30m for humanitarian purposes in the
first
month as
well as £10m for quick win projects. (Clare [Short] has allocated
£20m for
UN agencies’
preparations and earmarked another £60m from DFID’s
contingency
reserve for
humanitarian operations. But this is a drop in the ocean; in the
worse
case, if
the Oil-for-Food programme ground to a halt, Iraq could need as
much as a
billion
dollars a month for humanitarian aid.)
“The
expectation is that UK forces would be responsible for a task
focused on Basra
and other
key military objectives in the South-East of Iraq, which could
include
20 percent
of the Iraqi population. This task is broadly proportionate to the
size of
the UK’s
contribution to overall Coalition land forces …
“In
parallel, and under the overall military command, the US plan to
bring in a
transitional
administration500
to
co-ordinate immediate civil relief and humanitarian
assistance.
The transitional administration is making plans for allocating its
limited
resources,
including provision of public sector salaries, on a nation wide,
Coalition
basis.
There is no expectation that the UK would be asked to contribute
any
resources
to anything other than security. So there is no suggestion that the
UK
would be
left to foot the bill for the civil administration or the costs of
humanitarian
relief and
reconstruction in any area.”
1161.
Mr Straw
and Mr Hoon reported that US planning remained “sensibly
flexible”
once the
initial phase was over and “a major part of Iraq has been
stabilised”. It advised
that
US planning:
“…
recognises that parts of Iraq will be more permissive than others
and that
security
could well be provided through something other than sectors. It
would
be
premature now to take a view on the merits of sectors for this
stage. We are
well placed
to influence US thinking with a number of military officers and
officials
embedded
within their military headquarters and in ITCA. It would be
helpful for
500
A footnote
explained: “The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance (ORHA) becomes the
transitional
administration once it is established inside Iraq.”
518