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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
… with the US”. The letter recommended that Sir David Manning raise the issue with his
US interlocutors during his imminent visit to Washington.
185.  The briefing note attached to the letter confirmed that SIS would be sending more
staff to Iraq to help the US effort on the ground, including debriefing centres. The likely
timescales for successful exploitation of sites was not to be underestimated:
“UNMOVIC allowed an average of two hours per facility, and found virtually nothing.
It had taken over two weeks to exploit and verify a single find, the mobile laboratory.
There were hundreds of known sites to exploit …”
186.  The note also addressed the suspect trailer and provided an update on
investigations into CW munitions and production which had yet to produce concrete
evidence.
187.  Sir David Manning passed the briefing note to Mr Blair, describing it as “An update
on the problems and the (reasonably promising) prospects.”93
The investigation of possible mobile production facilities
for biological agent
On 3 May, Lieutenant General Andrew Ridgway, Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI)
informed Mr Hoon’s Private Office that the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) assessed
that a “trailer recovered north of Mosul on 24 April could be used as a component of a
transportable BW facility”.94
Lt Gen Ridgway wrote that:
“The trailer has a vessel with a capacity of over 100 litres of agent. It is assessed
that […]”
“The discovery of the trailer is highly significant … It is a gun, but not a smoking gun.”
Some details had already appeared in the US media, but “their full significance has
yet to emerge”.
Mr Hoon was invited to agree that:
the exploitation of the trailer was urgent and should be co-ordinated between the US
and UK;
the US should be asked to agree to Dr Blix being briefed and to consider the
evidence being examined by an independent third party; and
the discovery and likely role of the trailer should not be publicised until the US and
UK had agreed a common position.
93  Manuscript comment Manning to Prime Minister, 11 May 2003, on Letter SIS4 to Manning, 9 May 2003,
‘WMD in Iraq’.
94  Minute Ridgway to PS/SofS [MOD], 3 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Probable Transportable BW Production Trailer’.
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