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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
Cabinet, 13 February 2003
331.  Mr Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced on 12 February
that he was allocating a further £750m to help meet the costs of potential military action
in Iraq.91
332.  Mr Blair convened a meeting on humanitarian issues with Mr Straw, Mr Hoon,
Ms Short, Adm Boyce and No.10 officials in the margins of Cabinet on 13 February.92
That meeting is addressed in Section 6.5.
333.  In Cabinet on 13 February, Mr Straw stated that Iraq was not co-operating
on substance and its Al Samoud missiles and engines could be further evidence
of a material breach of resolution 1441. The authority of the UN was at stake.
334.  Mr Hoon stated that the second resolution needed to provide straightforward
legal justification for taking military action.
335.  Mr Blair concluded that there was no point in conceding more time for
inspections if the lack of co-operation did not permit the inspectors to do their
job. The “best course was to keep our nerve and persevere”.
336.  Mr Straw told Cabinet on 13 February that the UN inspectors were likely to tell
the Security Council on 14 February that:
“… the Iraqis were co-operating a bit more on the process but not on the substance.
One issue of significance could be the inspectors’ attitude to the Al Samoud missiles
and the 223 new Volga engines, which they could decide were in breach of Iraq’s
obligations. That would be further evidence of material breach.”93
He would report to the House of Commons later that day that Iraq had been, and
continued to be in material breach; and that further confirmation of the facts by the
inspectors “would lead logically to a Security Council resolution”.
337.  Mr Straw also reported difficulties in NATO over a request from Turkey for support.
That was “a serious situation which was pulling NATO apart”. The Presidency of the EU
had called a summit [meeting of the European Council] for 17 February.
338.  Mr Straw told his colleagues that:
“… the authority of the United Nations was at stake. There was a parallel with the
failure of the League of Nations in the 1930s to enforce international law … The best
chance of avoiding military action was to hold our nerve in keeping to the United
Nations process.”
91  House of Commons, Official Report, 12 February 2003, column 883.
92  Letter Cannon to Bewes, 13 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Humanitarian Issues’.
93  Cabinet Conclusions, 13 February 2003.
238
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