The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
331.
Mr Gordon
Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced on 12
February
that he was
allocating a further £750m to help meet the costs of potential
military action
332.
Mr Blair
convened a meeting on humanitarian issues with Mr Straw,
Mr Hoon,
Ms Short,
Adm Boyce and No.10 officials in the margins of Cabinet on 13
February.92
That
meeting is addressed in Section 6.5.
333.
In Cabinet
on 13 February, Mr Straw stated that Iraq was not
co-operating
on substance
and its Al Samoud missiles and engines could be further
evidence
of a
material breach of resolution 1441. The authority of the UN was at
stake.
334.
Mr Hoon
stated that the second resolution needed to provide
straightforward
legal
justification for taking military action.
335.
Mr Blair
concluded that there was no point in conceding more time
for
inspections
if the lack of co-operation did not permit the inspectors to do
their
job. The
“best course was to keep our nerve and persevere”.
336.
Mr Straw
told Cabinet on 13 February that the UN inspectors were likely to
tell
the Security
Council on 14 February that:
“… the
Iraqis were co-operating a bit more on the process but not on the
substance.
One issue
of significance could be the inspectors’ attitude to the Al Samoud
missiles
and the 223
new Volga engines, which they could decide were in breach of
Iraq’s
obligations.
That would be further evidence of material breach.”93
He would
report to the House of Commons later that day that Iraq had been,
and
continued
to be in material breach; and that further confirmation of the
facts by the
inspectors
“would lead logically to a Security Council
resolution”.
337.
Mr Straw
also reported difficulties in NATO over a request from Turkey for
support.
That was “a
serious situation which was pulling NATO apart”. The Presidency of
the EU
had called
a summit [meeting of the European Council] for 17
February.
338.
Mr Straw
told his colleagues that:
“… the
authority of the United Nations was at stake. There was a parallel
with the
failure of
the League of Nations in the 1930s to enforce international law …
The best
chance of
avoiding military action was to hold our nerve in keeping to the
United
Nations
process.”
91
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 12
February 2003, column 883.
92
Letter
Cannon to Bewes, 13 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Humanitarian
Issues’.
93
Cabinet
Conclusions, 13 February 2003.
238