The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
constructively
towards a better future for Basra. We will also continue to work
on
the US –
whose REO [Regional Embassy Office] persists in sending out
downbeat
reports,
contributing to US disquiet over Basra, most recently predicting a
rise in
Shia on
Shia and other Islamic violence.
“Overall it
is welcome that the centre is finally paying attention to Basra and
Basra’s
needs:
their worries reflect a growing sense of ownership, which we have
long
wished to
see.”
428.
On 26
September, Maj Gen Binns wrote to Lt Gen Houghton, observing that
he
had not
received a formal response to his minute of 16 September, which
asked for
authority
to negotiate the best deal possible without seeking further
clearance.209
The
minute had
instead resulted in a request from PJHQ for a campaign plan. Having
seen
an early
draft of one, Maj Gen Binns concluded that “the work would be
nugatory. The
operation
is too dynamic.” He believed that enthusiasm for the negotiations
was waning
in London,
and asked Lt Gen Houghton for instructions.
429.
Maj Gen Binns
asked Lt Gen Houghton to agree that “end state” should
be
“enduring
security which facilitates and preserves a political climate
suitable for
development”.
He wrote:
“I am
operating with current headroom to release two further tranches of
five
internees
on 28 September and 5 Oct. I need more headroom; another five
for
release on
12 Oct and then a further 15 to be released between 13 Oct and 3
Nov
in order
to keep the process alive.”
430.
In his weekly
update on 27 September, Maj Gen Binns commented that the
UK
should be
seeking to:
“… marshal
its available and not inconsiderable resources to convince the
US
hierarchy
that PIC is doable so that we can get past PIC and work on the
post-PIC
mission.
The key point is to trust the Iraqis to take responsibility for
their own destiny,
having
given them the tools to do so.”210
431.
The MNF-I had
established a working group to review the situation
and
Maj Gen Binns
intended to use the forthcoming visit to Basra by its
leader,
US Major General
Roberson, to “take the initiative and enlist his aid to get Basra
to PIC”.
432.
In the same
report, Maj Gen Binns reported that a car bomb attack at a
police
station in
Basra on 25 September had killed three and wounded 17 others. He
wrote that
car bomb
attacks were a “relative rarity” in MND(SE). Locally, the attack
was believed to
have been
carried out by AQ.
209
Minute GOC
MND(SE) to CJO, 26 September 2007, ‘[NAME OF OPERATION]
Strategy’.
210
Minute
Binns to CJO, 27 September 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq
Update –
27 September
2007’.
264