4.4 | The
search for WMD
478.
Mr Scarlett
reported to Sir Nigel Sheinwald that the US official had
strongly
agreed with
the UK’s preferred approach, but had made the point that the US and
UK
“could not
just draft an Executive Summary as if we owned the Report”.
Mr Scarlett
had
acknowledged the point, “but repeated that the exceptional
sensitivity of public
presentation
on this issue meant that we had to be involved”.
479.
Mr Blair
and President Bush discussed the importance of the ISG’s
forthcoming
Report in
their video conference on 16 September.263
Mr Blair
stated that Dr Kay should
be able to
refer to:
•
the extent
of Saddam’s concealment operations;
•
a ballistic
missile programme on a far greater scale than intelligence
had
indicated;
•
that Saddam
had intended and prepared to reconstitute a nuclear
programme
after
sanctions were lifted; and
•
CW and BW
programmes had been in existence as recently as the
previous year.
480.
On
18 September, Mr Wood reported from Washington that
Mr Howard had
been
invited to discuss the draft ISG Interim Report at CIA Headquarters
on 22 and
481.
Initially,
Mr Wood suggested that Mr Howard take the opportunity to
call on
Mr Dan
Bartlett, White House Communications Director. He subsequently
commented to
Mr Miller
that a call on Mr Bartlett:
“… needs to
be weighed against the risk of Howard’s visit leaking & being
portrayed
as a
‘sexing up’ exercise. May be better for us [the British Embassy] to
follow up
separately
with Bartlett/White House.”265
482.
Mr Miller
informed Mr Howard that, after consulting Sir David Manning,
Mr Wood
had decided
it might be better if the visit did not involve meetings with the
press and was
kept to the
intelligence community.266
483.
On
19 September, Mr Rycroft chaired a meeting at No.10 to
discuss how to handle
the Interim
Report.267
The Cabinet
Office, the MOD, the FCO and SIS were represented.
263
Letter
Cannon to Adams, 16 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
video-conference with Bush,
16 September’.
264
Telegram
JICTEL 95 Washington to JIC London, 18 September 2003, ‘Iraq
WMD: Kay Report’.
265
Manuscript
comment Wood to Miller on Telegram JICTEL 95 Washington to JIC
London,
18 September 2003,
‘Iraq WMD: Kay Report’.
266
Manuscript
comment Miller to Howard on Telegram JICTEL 95 Washington to JIC
London,
18 September
2003, ‘Iraq WMD: Kay Report’.
267
Minute
Cannon to Watkins, 19 September 2003, ‘Iraq Survey
Group’.
521