The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
924.
On 29
November, the FCO Board discussed priorities for the coming
months,
including
reviewing Iraq policy and planning:
“The Board
agreed that the possibility of war in Iraq would remain the
prime
focus of
attention over the next months. It discussed contingency plans
being put
in place.
Work was in hand on staffing and establishing emergency
units.
Procedures
were due to be tested in January … Board members stressed the
need
to keep the
level of threat under review; and to keep examining and testing out
the
925.
The Board also
discussed whether further costs were likely to arise in the
context
of Iraq
contingency planning. The MOD had already placed a claim on the
Reserve and
there was a
strong case for an FCO claim “which would be strengthened if we
could
point to
clear decisions being taken now to prioritise our
spending”.
926.
FCO claims on
the Reserve are addressed in Section 13.1.
927.
A paper on FCO
prioritisation was prepared for the Board in March 2003 and
is
described
in Section 6.5.
928.
On 2 December,
Mr Ricketts sent Sir Michael Jay advice on “preparations
for
handling an
all-out Iraq crisis”.448
In a brief
description of how the FCO was “already
geared up
to deal with the increased intensity of work on Iraq”, he included
references
to the
procurement of items for the future Baghdad Embassy, contingency
planning for
CBW
protection in the region, and consular contingency planning. Most
of the advice
addressed
the role of the FCO Emergency Unit and choreography of
departmental
meetings.
929.
Mr Ricketts
explained that he held daily meetings at 9.00am to co-ordinate
FCO
activity,
chaired in his absence by another FCO Board member or Mr Chaplin.
He also
described
the Iraq-related responsibilities of FCO senior
officials:
“William
Ehrman [Director General Defence and Intelligence] deals with JIC
and
MOD, Graham
Fry [Director General Wider World] supervises work on
consular
planning …;
Edward Chaplin and Charles Gray take the lead on policy
advice,
working
with DSI for longer range thinking, with the UN and CFSP [Common
Foreign
and
Security Policy] teams, with the Legal Advisers and others. I have
deliberately
involved a
wide spread of senior managers, because we may well have to
sustain
an intense
crisis for a significant period …
“You will
of course want to be closely involved in all the policy-making. One
of the
key tasks
of the Emergency Unit is to prepare the Foreign Secretary and you
for the
[anticipated]
No.10 meetings, to ensure the FCO is pro-active and thinking
ahead.
I propose
to take responsibility under you as overall co-ordinator
…
447
Minutes, 29
November 2002, FCO Board.
448
Minute
Ricketts to PUS [FCO], 2 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Handling the
Crisis’.
268