4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
level to
allow common understanding of issues for the drafting of cross
intelligence
community
reports and studies commissioned by the JIC.”
640.
ACM French
also wrote that he had not discussed the concerns raised by
DIS
staff with
Mr Scarlett, Mr Miller, or any member of the Assessments
Staff. He could
not “remember
the specific discussion” with Mr Cragg or Dr Roper but
added:
“… in the
regular staffing of JIC papers, the dossier included, it was not
unusual
for subject
matter experts to have differences of opinion over the emphasis
given
to specific
strands of intelligence and those concerns would be raised with me
for
consideration
before final clearance.”
641.
Asked on what
basis he had given formal DIS endorsement to the
judgements
in the
dossier given the advice of some members of the DIS that the final
draft was,
in some
respects, stronger than the intelligence indicated, ACM French
wrote:
“The fact
that individuals expressed concern was part of the usual process
of
debate and
assessment which went on regularly within the DIS and within the
wider
intelligence
community as a prelude to a consensus being reached by the
JIC.
My judgement
was that the well tried due process had been followed and I
was
content
with the final draft of the dossier.”
642.
In his
statement to the Iraq Inquiry, Mr Cragg wrote that he had not
seen the report
and that he
had had “no discussions at the time” with “anybody” about its
contents and
implications
because he “had not received it or had any knowledge of its
contents or
source”.350
He had
“asked Dr Roper to inform Dr Jones … of the strict
compartmenting
of the
report at the earliest opportunity”.
643.
Asked about
his response to the concerns raised by DIS staff, Mr Cragg
wrote
that he had
had “a brief discussion with Dr Roper on 17 September about the
[DIS]
comments on
the draft of 16 September”. He had “interrupted a meeting” he was
holding
with Dr
Roper and the DIS Director of Global Issues on 17 September to
allow them to
hear an
account of the meeting held by Mr Miller. The DIS officials
who had attended the
meeting
reported that “the SIS participant had informed them that
particularly sensitive
intelligence
on the production of chemical and biological agent had very
recently been
received
which supported the formulation in the draft”; and that
Mr Miller “had concurred”
with that.
The SIS representative had also informed them that the distribution
would be
extremely
limited.
644.
Mr Cragg
did not attend the JIC meeting on 11 September. He wrote that
the
11 September
SIS report was not discussed at the JIC meeting on 18
September.
645.
Mr Cragg
saw a copy of Dr Jones’ minute to Dr Roper of 19 September in
which
he stated
that he and his staff “considered that in their judgement Iraq was
probably
350
Statement,
15 June 2011.
237