6.1 | Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq

planning directive to EUCOM, who would be responsible for the northern option, tasked

it to provide logistic support for a division‑sized force, either coalition or US only.

554. Dr Cholerton advised Mr Hoon that it would be “important to guard against any

false assumptions the US might make about the UK’s potential contribution to any

military action”. The UK should explain the consequences of Op FRESCO to the US

once a decision had been taken to commence training.

555. In relation to forthcoming US/Turkish discussions in Washington, the UK had made

it clear to the US that:

“… in advance of UK political decisions, it would be wrong to discuss potential UK

participation in ground operations from Turkey with the Turkish General Staff.”

556. Commenting on a draft of the advice to Mr Hoon, a civilian in PJHQ had pointed

out that “a discrete UK option need not necessarily mean a northern attack through

Turkey”.226

557. On 28 August, the MOD’s revised assessment of the implications of Op FRESCO

was set out in a letter to Sir David Manning.227

558. The MOD also stated that Mr Hoon:

“… considers it particularly important that we guard against any false assumptions

that the US might make about the UK’s potential contribution to any military action …

Explaining the impact … to the US would … serve to focus US planners on the real

practical limitations we would face, were political decisions taken to join the US in

military action.”

559. Sir David Manning commented to Mr Powell that he was not clear where the Fire

Brigades issue stood; and that he would be “grateful for a word ab[ou]t what to say to

Washington and when”.228

560. PJHQ reported on 30 August that Land Command believed it would be able

to deploy a division.

561. PJHQ also identified the risks associated with the northern option.

562. On 30 August, Lt Gen Reith submitted an update on the timelines for deploying

a division (minus) to Lt Gen Pigott.229

226 Email PJHQ–J9‑HD(Pol/Ops) to VCDS/PS, 23 August 2002, ‘PJHQ Comment on Iraq Submission’.

227 Letter Williams to Manning, 28 August 2002, ‘Iraq – Potential UK Contribution and a Fire Strike’.

228 Manuscript comment Manning to Powell, 30 August 2002, on Letter Williams to Manning,

28 August 2002, ‘Iraq – Potential UK Contribution and a Fire Strike’.

229 Minute Reith to DCDS(C), 30 August 2002, ‘Operations Against Iraq Deployment Timeline of a UK

Division (‑) through Turkey’.

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