9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
It said that Lt
Gen Lamb had sought and received “approval to proceed” from
both
Dr Rubaie
and Gen Petraeus.
183.
The senior
official’s advice also recorded the meeting between Maj Gen
Shaw,
government
officials working closely with the military and JAM1 on 25
July.
On 11
August, the Governor and the Provincial Director of Police in
Diwaniyah were
assassinated.81
Lt Gen
Rollo commented that the attacks were “unexpected” and
that there
was increasing evidence that JAM, using Iranian supplied weapons,
was
responsible.
The motive for the attacks was unclear.
184.
A senior
government official specialising in the Middle East (1) wrote to
the
FCO
Director General Defence and Intelligence on 20 August with an
update on the
negotiations
with JAM1.82
He reported
that on 11 August, government officials working
closely
with the military met JAM1 “to establish that a deal was still on
the table”. JAM1
confirmed
that it was, provided the four nominated detainees were released in
advance.
Government
officials working closely with the military confirmed that this had
been
approved.
The senior official recorded that MOD Ministers had given their
agreement to
the
releases and that they had been discussed in advance with the Iraqi
Government
and with
Gen Petraeus.
185.
Another
meeting had followed on 12 August, at which JAM1 sought to
reassure
Maj Gen
Shaw that the deal would work, although it would take some time to
impose
a full
cease-fire. Maj Gen Shaw noted that there was widespread scepticism
within the
UK, US and
Iraqi systems over JAM1’s ability to deliver and his motives. The
success of
the
initiative would be measured by a significant reduction in IDF and
attacks on supply
convoys;
and by respect for the ISF’s occupation of Basra Palace. What
constituted a
“significant
reduction” was not defined. JAM1 warned that there were attacks
planned
against the
convoys withdrawing from Basra Palace and it would take him 10 to
15 days
to call
them off.
186.
In his own
record of the discussion Maj Gen Shaw wrote:
“The
meeting exceeded my expectations and left me more optimistic about
his intent
and the
potential scope of the success this proposal might
engender.”83
81
Minute
Rollo to CDS, 13 August 2007, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (265) 13 Aug
07’.
82
Minute
senior government official specialising in the Middle East (1) to
Leslie, 20 August 2007, ‘[NAME
OF
OPERATION]: update on negotiations with JAM in
Basrah’.
83
Minute
Shaw, 12 August 2007, ‘[JAM1]/GOC Meeting, 12 Aug 07’.
217