3.1 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January
2002
strikes).
But such action would carry significant downsides in terms of
alienating
world
opinion.”
“The US is
in no mood to co-operate with Iraq. A likely option is to make
specific
demands
backed up by threats of tougher action in the event of
non-compliance.
Whether
this includes military action will depend on US judgements about
the
balance of
advantage between the domestic pressures and the
international
ramifications
of such actions.”
158.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock, UK Permanent Representative to the UN in New
York,
wrote to
Sir David Manning on 29 October warning that the UK’s draft
resolution
adapting
the sanctions regime “looks unachievable this autumn, largely
because of
Russian
obduracy and US unwillingness to exert sufficient pressure to move
them”.89
“… there
remains an urgent need for us to sort out a coherent strategy with
the
Americans,
and at a level which binds in the whole Administration and not just
the
State
Department. Our conversations with them recently … have not managed
this.
The WMD
danger is too great to ignore. A vacuum not just in the Security
Council,
but also in
our collective policy is looming. Most dangerously, the volume of
talk …
about the
military option looks from here to risk real damage to our wider
interests
in the
Middle East and our campaign against terrorism.
“In New
York, there is widespread scepticism of the US/UK approach … The
policy
is seen not
only as a failure, but also the foremost example of the double
standards
… in the
Middle East. This corrodes support directly for sanctions … but
also
insidiously
for our broader objectives on Afghanistan and terrorism. In the
longer run,
the failure
of the Council to secure Iraqi compliance with the resolutions
undermines
its
credibility more generally.
“We
therefore need to think hard about a clear long-term strategy … to
fill this
vacuum (and
to prevent the militarists doing so).”
160.
Sir Jeremy set
out the main elements for such a strategy, including:
•
Drawing in
the Russians on controlling Iraq’s WMD and Saddam Hussein
more
generally.
•
Exploring
the possibility of restoring P5 unity, which would require thinking
about
the
clarification of resolution 1284 (1999).
•
Working out
whether UNMOVIC had any genuine political value. The
Americans
did “not
want a repeat of the UNSCOM problem, with Saddam calling the
shots”.
89
Letter
Greenstock to Manning, 29 October 2001, ‘Iraq: Cabinet Office
Meeting, 30 October’.
341