10.4 |
Conclusions: Reconstruction
57.
In his first
report from Basra, sent on 7 August, Sir Hilary wrote that he
currently had
no secure
communication with Baghdad or London, there were no telephone
landlines
and mobile
coverage was patchy.
58.
On 10 and 11
August, there were serious riots in Basra. Cabinet Office
officials
attributed
the disturbances to increasing frustration with the Coalition’s
failure to restore
basic
services. Ministers agreed that Sir Hilary “should be given such
assistance and
staff as he
deemed necessary to improve the workings of
CPA(South)”.19
59.
At the end of
August, Sir Hilary Synnott requested 37 specialist staff
and
20 armoured
vehicles for CPA(South). He requested a further 44 staff at the end
of
October. In
his valedictory report in January 2004, Sir Hilary stated
that:
“A bid for
37 additional and expert staff … was endorsed by Ministers
immediately …
by early
January, 18 of the 37 new staff had still not
arrived.”20
60.
The FCO did
not provide adequate practical support to Sir Hilary Synnott as
Head of
CPA(South).
61.
Departments’
failure to respond to Ministers’ demands for additional
civilian
personnel
in Basra and elsewhere in Iraq is addressed in Section
15.2.
62.
The decision
to take on the leadership of the CPA(South) had
significant
implications,
lasting well beyond the end of the Occupation. The South would
occupy the
attention
of Ministers and senior officials and absorb the majority of the UK
resources
available
for reconstruction.
63.
Sir Michael
Jay was aware, in particular through his participation in Mr
Blair’s
6 March
and 17 April meetings, that the decision to provide the Head of
CPA(South)
would have
significant resource implications. He did not ensure that those
were
addressed.
64.
Sir Michael,
as FCO Permanent Under Secretary, failed to ensure that the
FCO
provided
the support needed by Sir Hilary Synnott as Head of
CPA(South).
65.
On 15
November, the Iraqi Governing Council unveiled a timetable for the
transfer
of power to
a transitional Iraqi administration by 30 June 2004, at which point
the CPA
would be
dissolved. The announcement took UK officials and contractors
working in the
CPA by
surprise.
66.
The decision
to transfer power earlier than had been expected (the CPA’s
plans
had
extended for some years) had significant implications for the
reconstruction effort.
The CPA
focused on programmes which could deliver a visible and immediate
impact in
support of
reconciliation and the political transition process, and shelved
programmes
19
Minutes, 28
August 2003, Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
20
Telegram 10
Basra to FCO London, 26 January 2004, ‘Basra
Valedictory’.
537