The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
the
strategy will require the active involvement of a wide range of
Departments in
country
…”
333.
On 16 January,
the Principal Private Secretary to Lord Peter Mandelson,
Business,
Innovation
and Skills Secretary, wrote to Mr Brown’s Assistant Private
Secretary setting
out plans
for UKTI resources in Iraq.127
He reported
that three new UKTI staff would be
operating
in Baghdad in the coming weeks and that a vacant Commercial
Assistant slot
had been
filled. All four would cover the whole of Iraq and would work with
UKTI staff in
Jordan
“maximising the potential for British exporters and
investors”.
334.
On 19 January,
the day before the inauguration of Mr Obama as the 44th
President
of the
United States, Mr Brown telephoned President Bush and said
that he had been
proud to
work together on Iraq.128
335.
Mr Alistair
Darling, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr John Hutton, the
Defence
Secretary,
and Mr Alexander all confirmed their agreement to the proposed
strategy.129
336.
Mr Hutton’s
Private Secretary reported that:
“… the
decision to retain an Embassy office in Basra is welcome, as this
should help
us to
preserve our legacy and to support UK business in southern Iraq.
Indeed, the
Defence
Secretary hopes that HMG will do all it can to encourage and
support UK
business to
take advantage of the commercial opportunities now available in
Iraq.”130
337.
On 26 January,
days before the provincial elections, Lt Gen Cooper’s
Policy
Adviser
reported that election planning had “generated major administrative
and security
challenges
to which, as matters stand, the Iraqi Higher Electoral Commission
(IHEC)
and the ISF
are responding positively”.131
338.
On 28 January,
at the request of the MOD, the JIC assessed the strategic
threats
facing Iraq
and the UK change of mission in 2009.132
Its Key
Judgements included:
“I. Iraq
will face significant political and security challenges in 2009,
but these are
unlikely to
threaten overall stability while US forces remain and the
progressive shift
from
violence to politics continues. National elections will maintain
the focus on
political
activity and delay progress on the long-standing disputes that
divide Iraq.
“II. The
greatest strategic threat to Iraq’s stability stems from internal
political
failures
that could lead to renewed violence within and between Iraq’s
Sunni, Shia
127
Letter Abel
to Catsaras, 16 January 2009, [untitled].
128
Letter
Fletcher to Gould, 19 January 2009, ‘Prime Minister’s Call with US
President, 19 January’.
129
Letter
Jordan to Hickey, 26 January 2009, ‘Iraq Strategy’; Letter Ferguson
to Catsaras, 29 January
2009,
‘Iraq: Strategy’; Letter Wright to Catsaras, 5 February 2009, ‘Iraq
Strategy’.
130
Letter
Ferguson to Catsaras, 29 January 2009, ‘Iraq:
Strategy’.
131
Minute
POLAD to PSO/CDS, 26 January 2009, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (337) 26
Jan 09’.
132
JIC
Assessment, 28 January 2009, ‘Iraq: Threats to Stability and UK
Mission Change in 2009’.
436