3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
344.
The record of
the discussion was sent to Mr Straw’s and
Mr Hoon’s
Private Secretaries.
345.
Secretary
Powell subsequently contacted Mr Straw to express
concerns
about the
UK’s activity in New York.
346.
Mr Straw
told Sir Jeremy Greenstock not to table the UK’s revised
draft
resolution,
only a “non-paper” setting out “six tests”.
347.
After
Mr Blair’s conversation with President Bush, Mr Straw
spoke three times
to Secretary
Powell.
348.
In their first
conversation at 4.30pm, Secretary Powell asked for clarification
of
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock’s instructions in the light of his activity on a new
resolution.
Mr Straw
explained that Secretary Rumsfeld’s intervention had “complicated
matters”
in the
UK:
“We now had
to go even further to show we were pursuing an alternative
to
automatic
war. Greenstock’s instructions came from himself and the Prime
Minister.
He had
already spoken to Ivanov and Alvear [Mrs Soledad Alvear, the
Chilean
Foreign
Minister] about the new draft.”112
349.
Following
further discussion about the US position that the UN route
was
exhausted
and their concerns about the UK activity in the UN, Mr Straw
told Secretary
Powell that
“nonetheless it was important to go through the motions”. The
chance
of success
was “one per cent” but “if Jeremy succeeded we would have to go for
it”.
Mr Straw
added: “But there was a ninety nine per cent chance that this would
simply
be for
PR.”
350.
The letter
reporting the conversation was sent to Sir David Manning and copied
to
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock, Mr Brenton, Sir Michael Jay, FCO Permanent Under
Secretary
(PUS), and
Mr Ricketts.
351.
The Government
has been unable to find any record of the second
conversation.113
352.
In a third
conversation at 6pm, Secretary Powell reiterated concern
about
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock’s activity at the UN and the risks if people thought a
real effort
was under
way which was then brought to an abrupt end on 17
March.114
112
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 12 March 2003, ‘Foreign Secretary’s
Conversation with US Secretary
of State
12 March’.
113
Minute
Cabinet Office to Iraq Inquiry, 14 March 2014, ‘Declassification:
3.6B-MA-4’.
114
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 12 March 2003, ‘Foreign Secretary’s
Conversation with US Secretary
of State
12 March’.
459