12.1 | Security Sector Reform

hung out to dry by Baghdad if they get too closely involved. We can avoid some

of the pain by doing even more to keep Maliki … in the loop (and paying the price

in operational security – the fact that no members of the SCU were caught in the

Jameat suggests they were warned off). But we can’t make Maliki more determined

or happier to confront the Shia militias. And we can’t get to PIC unless we can show

that the ISF are ready and able to confront the militias.”

1295. Maj Gen Shirreff, also reporting on Op THYME on 28 December, wrote that the

operation “may mark a decisive moment, if not the decisive act in our efforts to reform

the IPS in Basra”.1197 He thought it “brought to a head the hard choices that face the

Provincial Council, the Basra Security Committee and the ISF: do they confront or

continue to roll over in the face of the militia?”

1296. Maj Gen Shirreff criticised Maj Gen Latif for refusing to order a brigade to deploy

into an area, because JAM was there with Rocket Propelled Grenades and small arms.

Maj Gen Shirreff considered the Basra Security Committee “no longer fit for purpose”

after two members deserted the Committee during the operation and Brig Ibrahim

denied “any foreknowledge having previously been in full support”.

1297. On 4 January 2007, Maj Gen Shirreff reported that the relationship with the

Council remained tense, with all members refusing to meet the MNF face to face.1198

He was concerned about the welfare of the prisoners after SCU members had arrived

to work at the Warren facility. While prisoners had not been subject to further torture,

they had not received access to medical care or legal advice. The Director of Police had

assured he would keep SCU out of the Warren because it was not possible to be sure

who had been involved in the torture of prisoners.

1298. The consequences of Op THYME continued as members of the Provincial

Council refused to engage fully with the MNF.1199 They rejected evidence that the

MNF had authority for the operation and denied being briefed about it beforehand.

Maj Gen Shirreff believed it was “absolutely clear” that that was due to fear of reprisals

from JAM and SCU.

1299. Lt Gen Shirreff told the Inquiry about how Op THYME affected Op SINBAD:

“… there was some delay … but … there was no significant impact on SINBAD at

all. In fact, in a sense it allowed us to continue that process which had begun to

develop, but putting the Iraqis more into the lead on SINBAD …”1200

1197 Minute Shirreff to CJO, 28 December 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update –

28 December 2006’.

1198 Minute Shirreff to CJO, 4 January 2007, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 04 January 2007’.

1199 Minute Shirreff to CJO, 11 January 2007, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 17 January 2007’.

1200 Public hearing, 11 January 2010, pages 32‑33.

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