The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

357. On 15 July, the Iraq Strategy Group (ISG) considered a draft paper to be

signed by Dr John Reid, the Defence Secretary, on operational transition in Iraq

(see Section 9.4).249

358. The paper described a process in which Iraqi Security Forces would take

primacy province by province. The transfer would be implemented from October in

Maysan and Muthanna provinces. Basra and Dhi Qar would follow in spring 2006.

This would lead to a reduced profile for UK forces, and reductions in numbers to

around 3,000 by summer 2006.

359. After a discussion, the ISG concluded that the paper needed to cover more clearly

the implications for other government departments and international actors.

360. In the revised paper, sent to No.10 on 18 July, Dr Reid stated that the drawdown

could have an impact on the broader UK and international effort in the South:

“It is also possible that other (FCO and DFID) activity in Iraq aimed at developing

the Iraqi police service and reconstruction will need to be curtailed or reduced, with

consequent implications for HMG’s wider effort, because of the difficulties of running

projects without UK military support and protection. This will need to be looked at

in more detail with Other Government Departments.” 250

361. Dr Reid’s paper also recognised that, although the drawdown was likely to deliver

a significant cost saving to the military, there could be an increase in costs for others:

“Other Government Departments operating in Iraq may … face increased security

costs as they are forced to seek commercial alternatives to military force protection.”

362. The Ministerial Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy Sub‑Committee on

Iraq (DOP(I)) agreed Dr Reid’s recommendation on 21 July.251

363. On 16 September, the IPU advised Mr Straw and Sir Michael Jay that the

frequency and sophistication of attacks in Basra were increasing and the British

Embassy Office was locked down.252 The threat was greater than in autumn 2004.

The IPU recommended that the number of staff be kept under review and that

Sir Michael Jay press the MOD for a dedicated helicopter service.

364. Officials prepared a draft paper for DOP(I) on 27 September advising that civilian

activity in the South was “heavily reliant on UK forces for a range of services”, such as

accommodation outside Basra, helicopter transport and regular intelligence on security

249 Letter Cabinet Office [junior official] to Iraq Senior Officials, 15 July 2005, ‘MOD paper on operational

transition in Iraq’ attaching Paper MOD, ‘Operational transition in Iraq’.

250 Paper Secretary of State for Defence, 18 July 2005, ‘Operational Transition in Iraq’.

251 Minutes, 21 July 2005, DOP(I).

252 Minute Jeffrey to PS [FCO], 16 September 2005, ‘Basra Security Situation’.

306