The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
391.
Mr James
Tansley, the British Consul General in Basra from September 2005
to
April 2006,
told the Inquiry:
“The Jameat
incident effectively destroyed working relationships between
ourselves
and Basra
Council and the governorate. Although we patched things up, there
was
still an
underlying suspicion, and it was difficult to build … particularly
constructive
relations
with the officialdom or the government in Basra province
throughout
392.
Mr Tansley
commented that the combination of deteriorating security
and,
following the
Jameat incident, political constraints limited the progress that
the UK could
make on
reconstruction, SSR and preparing for the transfer of provincial
control to the
Iraqi
authorities.
393.
Against a
background of increasing insecurity, DFID continued to press the
World
Bank to
accelerate disbursement from its Trust Fund and to establish a
presence in Iraq.
394.
Dr Shafik met
Mr Chrik Poortman, World Bank Vice-President for the Middle
East,
on 20
September.229
Mr Poortman
argued that the rate of disbursement from the Bank’s
Trust Fund
was comparable with other post-conflict countries and expressed
concern
that faster
disbursement could increase the risk of corruption. He also
regretted the UK’s
“continual
public criticism” of the rate of disbursement, which was damaging
the Bank’s
ability to
attract donor support.
395.
The report of
the meeting was copied to DFID and Treasury officials.
Mr Anderson
commented:
“Chrik’s
arguments about disbursement rates are technically correct
…
“That the
Bank’s disbursement in Iraq is comparable to other … countries is
beside
the point –
aid to Iraq is not business as usual. That Iraq requires a
different
approach …
is the core point that Chrik does not accept.” 230
396.
Mr Chakrabarti
met Mr Poortman a few days later.231
397.
Mr Chakrabarti’s
briefing for the meeting stated that the Bank’s presence in
Iraq
comprised
one international consultant (now funded by the Bank, formerly by
DFID)
and seven
local staff. Of the US$400m committed to the World Bank Trust Fund,
only
US$31m had
been disbursed by July. DFID still saw the Trust Fund “as an
emergency
fund to be
disbursed quickly”.
228
Public
hearing, 22 June 2010, page 57.
229
Email DFID
[junior official] to Dinham and Anderson, 20 September 2005,
‘Read-out from
Minouche/Rain
Meeting with Chrik’.
230
Email
Anderson to Newton-Smith, 21 September 2005, ‘Chrik’s
Views’.
231
Briefing
DFID, [undated], ‘Chrik Poortman Meeting – Washington, 24-25
September 2005’.
262