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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
391.  Mr James Tansley, the British Consul General in Basra from September 2005 to
April 2006, told the Inquiry:
“The Jameat incident effectively destroyed working relationships between ourselves
and Basra Council and the governorate. Although we patched things up, there was
still an underlying suspicion, and it was difficult to build … particularly constructive
relations with the officialdom or the government in Basra province throughout
my time.” 228
392.  Mr Tansley commented that the combination of deteriorating security and,
following the Jameat incident, political constraints limited the progress that the UK could
make on reconstruction, SSR and preparing for the transfer of provincial control to the
Iraqi authorities.
393.  Against a background of increasing insecurity, DFID continued to press the World
Bank to accelerate disbursement from its Trust Fund and to establish a presence in Iraq.
394.  Dr Shafik met Mr Chrik Poortman, World Bank Vice-President for the Middle East,
on 20 September.229 Mr Poortman argued that the rate of disbursement from the Bank’s
Trust Fund was comparable with other post-conflict countries and expressed concern
that faster disbursement could increase the risk of corruption. He also regretted the UK’s
“continual public criticism” of the rate of disbursement, which was damaging the Bank’s
ability to attract donor support.
395.  The report of the meeting was copied to DFID and Treasury officials. Mr Anderson
commented:
“Chrik’s arguments about disbursement rates are technically correct …
“That the Bank’s disbursement in Iraq is comparable to other … countries is beside
the point – aid to Iraq is not business as usual. That Iraq requires a different
approach … is the core point that Chrik does not accept.” 230
396.  Mr Chakrabarti met Mr Poortman a few days later.231
397.  Mr Chakrabarti’s briefing for the meeting stated that the Bank’s presence in Iraq
comprised one international consultant (now funded by the Bank, formerly by DFID)
and seven local staff. Of the US$400m committed to the World Bank Trust Fund, only
US$31m had been disbursed by July. DFID still saw the Trust Fund “as an emergency
fund to be disbursed quickly”.
228  Public hearing, 22 June 2010, page 57.
229  Email DFID [junior official] to Dinham and Anderson, 20 September 2005, ‘Read-out from
Minouche/Rain Meeting with Chrik’.
230  Email Anderson to Newton-Smith, 21 September 2005, ‘Chrik’s Views’.
231  Briefing DFID, [undated], ‘Chrik Poortman Meeting – Washington, 24-25 September 2005’.
262
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