The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
124.
Mr Blair spoke
to President Bush, joined by Dr Rice, Vice President Dick
Cheney
and Mr Andy
Card, President Bush’s Chief of Staff, by video conference on the
afternoon
125.
Mr Blair
commented that reports from discussions with European
partners
indicated
that they would like to “find a way back”. He thought that getting
the right
“framework
of principles” for Phase IV should help.
126.
On 5 April,
Sir Jeremy Greenstock sent an update on post-conflict discussions
with
the US to
the FCO in London.59
Sir Jeremy
observed that the latest US draft resolution
“suggests
continuing UK/US differences that will be fundamental to whether or
not we
can secure
post-conflict UN resolutions”. He suggested that “piecemeal
resolutions”, as
opposed to
a single “omnibus” version, might be the right tactic, as it would
allow drafting
to be
responsive to conditions on the ground and for positive momentum to
build.
127.
Ms Short wrote
to Mr Blair on 7 April, copied to Mr Straw and others, urging him
to
“agree with
the US, proper limits to ORHA’s mandate and a process for inviting
the UN
to lead on
IIA preparations”.60
128.
Ms Short
identified four UK “bottom lines”:
•
limiting
ORHA’s mandate to Geneva and Hague Convention
obligations;
•
the process
for appointing the IIA should be facilitated by the
UN;
•
involving
International Financial Institutions in the reconstruction effort,
which
would
require a new resolution; and
•
revenues
from Iraq’s oil remaining under UN Security Council
stewardship.
129.
On the same
day, Mr Straw responded to a request from Mr Blair for advice
on
whether UK
secondees’ positions in ORHA should be formalised.61
His
response was
copied only
to Lord Goldsmith.
130.
Mr Straw said
that his instinctive reaction was that the UK ought to be
fully
involved in
ORHA. He had consulted officials and the Attorney General, and
relayed
the
latter’s initial reaction that if the UK formalised the position of
UK secondees “then
the risk of
the United Kingdom being jointly responsible for all
ORHA’s
actions increases
(including
in the 75 percent-80 percent of Iraq which will be under US and not
UK
de facto
control)”.
58
Letter
No.10 [junior official] to McDonald, 4 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime
Minister’s Video Conference with
President
Bush’.
59
Telegram
614 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 5 April 2003, ‘Iraq:
Post-Conflict’.
60
Letter
Short to Prime Minister, 7 April
2003, ‘Post Conflict Iraq’.
61
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 7 April 2003, ‘Iraq: OHRA’ attaching
‘Annex E: Draft Memorandum
of understanding
between the UK and US on OHRA’.
152