The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Sir John
reported was “widely shared here”. Secondly, President Chirac
thought Iraq’s
concealment
techniques would be “too good for the inspectors”. Thirdly, if
inspectors did
find
something, the French were bound to argue, at least in the first
place, that it showed
the inspections
were doing their job, making war unnecessary.
625.
Sir John
predicted that:
“If Saddam
manifestly blocks the inspectors, with or without a major find, but
more
obviously
with, the French will probably concede that he has had his chance
and
blown it,
vote for a second resolution … and take part [in military
action].
“If the
inspectors find something big, the French will first argue for the
continuation
of
inspections; but if it is a plausible smoking gun, and it is clear
the US (and we) are
committed
to military action, again they will probably commit to a second
resolution
and to take
part. But they will try everything to find alternatives
…
“If there
is no major obstruction and no smoking gun, France will oppose a
second
resolution
(while trying to avoid having to veto) and stay out of military
action,
though they
would probably at the end of day try to sound neutral …
Continuing
Iraqi deception
and only passive co‑operation … will almost certainly not be
enough
to persuade
them to change this in the short term …”
“As things
stand, there is a relatively narrow window of circumstances in
which
the French
would take part fully in military action: a clear casus
belli and a
second
resolution.
This looks to me possible in the next few weeks but not probable.
Short
of that,
they will not go with the Americans, though they could stop short
of outright
opposition
and be ready to do something to help eg backfilling.”
627.
Sir John
added that “The consequences for France of not being there if the
US go
are painful
for them to contemplate”, including being on the wrong side of the
argument
if the
action is an obvious rapid success. But:
“There
would be consolations if the Americans had no or few allies … And
if it all
went wrong,
they would be on the right side of the argument.”
628.
Addressing the
implications for UK policy, Sir John wrote that “the gap
between
the Prime
Minister’s convictions and Chirac’s is, for the present,
unbridgeable”. He saw
“no
alternative to massaging our differences … and staying within
shouting distance of
each
other”.
629.
Sir John
concluded that, if the UK and the French (and Germans) diverged
over
military
action, the consequences would depend:
“… on the
circumstances and the success of the war. But the implications for
the
successful
pursuit of our European policy … could be severe … So if any
chance
emerges in
the next few weeks of bringing our positions together, we should
grab
it with
both hands.”
110