9.5 | June 2006 to 27 June 2007

895. Mr Blair’s Private Secretary told Mr Blair that the visitors had found Gen Petraeus

and Ambassador Crocker:

“… heavily focused on trying to achieve the ‘benchmarks’ set by Congress, in

time for Petraeus’ interim testimony to Congress in July, and final testimony in

September.”489

896. On 12 June, the Chiefs of Staff noted:

“Some elements of the GoI’s [Government of Iraq’s] current plans for Basra Palace

post‑transition were of concern, including the intent to guard the Palace with a

dedicated Palace Guard Force (which had yet to be raised, trained or equipped).

Notwithstanding reported calls from within MNF‑I for local publicity, the intent

remained for the planned withdrawal from Basra Palace to be conducted in as low

key a manner as possible.”490

897. In his weekly report on 13 June, Maj Gen Shaw wrote:

“… the fate of BP [Basra Palace] rests now in the hands of GOI/MNF, and PM Maliki

has taken a personal interest in it. Any idea that we might be able to extend our

presence needs to appreciate the extent of Iraqi ownership of this issue, which itself

is a result of hard selling of the imperative requirement for UK to leave the Palace

in August.”491

898. Maj Gen Shaw also reported on the implications of the coalition’s existing

reconciliation effort for relations within MND(SE). He wrote:

“An MNF obsessed with the Sunni problem sees reconciliation through a Sunni

prism, the focus on Sunni tribes vs AQ. For the Shia, I contend that reconciliation

has to mean harnessing Iraqi nationalism in support of GoI against the Iranian

malign influences. Our presence confuses Shia loyalties; some support GoI and

hence don’t attack MNF; some (JAM etc) see MNF as occupiers and attack us

and hence are equivocal in their support of GoI; yet both sets would claim to be

nationalists. This issue is beginning to be of immediate relevance in Basra with the

question raised by JAM of senior public figures regarding their loyalties, ‘are you

a collaborator or nationalist?’ Convincing Muqtada al‑Sadr to buy in to the current,

as opposed to the post‑MNF, political process will be the key to Shia reconciliation

success, particularly in tackling the malign influences of the secret cells and Iran …

Al Sadr is already courting both Sunni and Shia groupings and calling them to join

him under a Nationalist banner. This, however, is at least in part balanced by Fadhila

and their cohort’s intention for a Federal Iraqi state. How well we manage to drive

a wedge between the nationalists, their current Iranian patrons and the Iranian

surrogates will have implications Iraq wide.”

489 Minute Banner to Blair, 14 June 2007, ‘Iraq Update, 14 June’.

490 Minutes, 12 June 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

491 Minute Shaw to CJO, 13 June 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 13 June 2007’.

167